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The relationship between we/they attitudes and the acceptance of war and planned violence against groups

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California School of Professional Psychology - Los Angeles, 1989

CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

Los Angeles

The Relationship Between We/They Attitudes and the Acceptance

of War and Planned Violence Against Groups

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Psychology

by

Alane Marie Miller-Kustek

1989

CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF   LOS ANGELES
PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY   CAMPUS

The dissertation of Alane Marie Miller-Kustek,
directed and approved by the candidate's
Committee, has been accepted by the Faculty
of the California School of Professional
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requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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1989

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To Ron with love...

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Relationship Between We/They Attitudes and the

Acceptance of War and Planned Violence Against Groups

by

Alane Marie Miller-Kustek

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

California School of Professional Psychology

1989

Paula Johnson, Ph.D., Chairperson

The purpose of this study was to investigate people's
perceptions of other groups of people and the relationship
of these perceptions to the acceptance of violence and war.
A model of one form of perceptions of others--we/they
relationships--was developed. It includes three components,
the perception of others as separate and different from,
less valuable than and dangerous to one's own group. These
components were evaluated across three groups; ethnic
groups, Soviets and general in-group/out-group. The link to
three forms of violence was also assessed--indirect
violence, direct violence and war.

A self-administered survey, which was developed for
this study, was used to assess the attitudes of 149 adult
residents of Los Angeles and Orange counties. Although
recruitment of the sample was haphazard, the sample appears

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to be reasonably representative of these urban Southern California counties. However, the results should be interpreted with caution due to the limited scope of the study.

Analysis of the data indicated a positive relationship between the three components of we/they relationships explored and the acceptance of the forms of violence which were measured: Seeing others as different, less valuable and dangerous were positively correlated with the acceptance of indirect violence, direct violence and war. This finding was consistent across the perceptions of people of another race, the Soviets and the general in-group/out-group. However, the tendency to perceive others as different was the least powerful predictor of acceptance of violence of all types. Attitudes toward people of other races were most strongly related to the acceptance of all forms of violence including war. The implications of these findings and suggestions for further research were discussed.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation will explore perceptions and values which contribute to war and other forms of planned violence against groups of people, factors which make the creation of peace difficult. Specifically, I will be exploring the tendency to conceptualize the world in terms of "we" and "they" (us and them), and whether this tendency has a relationship to the acceptance of violence as a means of resolving conflict. In this chapter the importance of research regarding peace, the relevance of psychology to this endeavor and the importance of clear and useful definitions of the problems regarding peace will be discussed. Finally, I will specifically define the focus and objectives of this dissertation.

Rationale

The issues facing humanity today regarding nuclear weaponry and the threat of war are inescapable. As calls for action and change come from groups and individuals of varied backgrounds around the world, psychology has entered

an era of self-critical examination of its own applicability, appropriateness, responsibility, and effectiveness in contributing to the field of international relations and peacemaking (Blight, 1987; Galtung, 1985; Jacobs, 1986, 1989; Kahn, Darilek, Graulard, & Brown, 1983; Morawski & Goldstein, 1985). Support for the need for psychology to take some role in these areas comes both from empirical studies (e.g., Feshbach & Singer, 1985; Holt, 1987) and theoretical explorations (e.g. Erikson, 1985; Frank, 1982; Holt, 1988; Intriligator, 1988; Keen, 1986; Smith, 1988; Spretnak, 1983; Volkan, 1985; White, 1984; Ziferstein, 1967).

The Effects of Living in the Nuclear Age. Research regarding the psychological effects of living in the nuclear age provides support for the need for psychologists to take an active role in exploring the concepts of war and peace and related factors. Numerous studies have measured the level and frequency of concern people experience regarding nuclear weapons and the threat of war (Carle, Tooley & Goode, 1988; Hesse, 1988; Hesse & Poklemba, 1987, 1988; Newsweek, 1981; Van Hoorn & French, 1988). For example, Zeitlin and Mack (1988) conducted interviews with children and adolescents ranging in age from 6 years old to 22 years old. They found the children had a "fair amount" of knowledge about nuclear weapons unless, as a 10 year old child said, they "...don't have a TV or radio, don't get

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newspapers and magazines, don't have a phone and don't go to school" (p. 5). These same children welcomed the opportunity to discuss their concerns. Studies focusing on the concern of adults (Van Hoorn & French, 1988) or children and adolescents (Carle et al., 1988; Hesse, 1988; Hesse & Poklemba, 1987; Newsweek, 1981) found that all groups think or worry about nuclear war at a surprisingly high frequency. Other research has indicated that the effects of the nuclear arms race on adolescents and young adults vary from depression (Buie, 1988), to apathy and a tendency to make changes in future plans such as getting married (Johnson, 1988; Mack, 1981), a tendency to increase risk taking behavior (Landers, 1988), and a sense of powerlessness and cynical resignation (Escalona, 1982; Loeb, 1988). As psychologists, it appears we not only have a role, but a responsibility, to explore an area which is of such concern to such a large number of people.

The Usefulness of Psychology in International Policymaking. Support for the role of psychology in the area of foreign relations and peacemaking comes on yet another level--the application of psychological knowledge regarding small groups to nations. In response to Blight's (1987) conclusion that psychology is limited in its usefulness to policymaking, Intriligator and Brito (1988) asked that we remember a declaration in the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural

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Organization: "That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed" (p. 318). Keen (1986) warns us that we should be "as wary of politicizing psychological events as we should be of psychologizing political events" (p. 11). In other words, war is a behavior which is both politically and psychologically motivated. Therefore, both fields can and should make useful contributions to our understanding of war and peace.

Intriligator (1988) also discusses nine broad issues within the area of peace research to which psychology seems appropriately and uniquely able to contribute. Of the nine areas, this dissertation will be related to the first in particular, attitudes toward other nations. Within this area I will focus on fear, mistrust, and misperception of the "other side" and the processes which both contribute to and are affected by these misperceptions.

White (1984), commenting on psychologists taking a role in the area of international relations, stated that since psychologists "are particularly trained in clinical work to take the view of the other, this is an area they can impact..." (p. 18). In other words, psychologists' training in empathy and understanding the behavior of others provides a potential capacity to transcend our stereotyped images of others and understand them in a more objective light, therefore correcting misperceptions. Klineberg (1984) also

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delineated several areas in which he felt psychology has a potential ability to affect public opinion, including the role of perception in international relations, the role of mutual ignorance, the dehumanization of the enemy, and the role of national stereotypes, all of which relate directly to the factor of we/they relationships studied in this dissertation.

Is War Inevitable? Before proceeding, a question must be addressed which is essential to any evaluation of the usefulness of research regarding we/they relationships and acceptance of violence and war. Is war inevitable? If the answer is yes, then this research may have limited usefulness in that the existence of war would be a given. Therefore, the controversy regarding the inevitability of war will be briefly explored.

Throughout history, the idea that war cannot be abolished had been widely accepted. This view was often accepted in American psychology during the early part of the twentieth century, and was based on the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Smith, 1986). Blight (1987), in an exploration of the usefulness of psychology in affecting policymaking stated, "The more we learn about our mammalian ancestors, the less optimistic we ought to become about somehow expunging human aggression" (p. 24). Smith (1988) responded, ..."as if computerized megadeaths were somehow understandable in terms of biological aggressiveness!" (p.

326). Smith is emphasizing the difference between aggressive acts by animals for the purposes of self-protection or the establishment of personal dominance and years of building for and planning attacks on other groups of people, which appears to be a behavior particular to humans. Keen (1986) emphasized the difference between a natural capacity for aggression which can be acted on or not, and an instinct for aggression which would leave humankind no choice; he concludes aggression is a human capacity. Similarly, Peck (1987) points out that the human capacity for change, or as he terms it transformation, provides hope that we can transcend the predominantly violent way we relate to each other as human beings.

In 1986 a group of leading biological and social scientists met in Seville, Spain to consider the belief that war is biological. Their conclusion was that, "Humanity can be freed from the bondage of biological pessimism....the same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace" (Adams, 1986, p. 2). Based on research in their various areas of expertise they rejected five commonly held myths regarding the human race and war by stating that 1) it is scientifically incorrect to say humans inherited the tendency to make war from their animal ancestors, 2) war or any other violent behavior is not programmed into human nature, 3) human evolution has not selected for aggressive behavior more than other kinds of behavior, 4) humans do not

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have a "violent brain", and 5) war is not caused by "instinct" or any single motivation. Similarly, Kohn (1988) provides evidence that war is not inevitable through examples of peaceful primitive societies, as well as societies which were formerly warlike but are now peaceful.

Lack of Clarity and Consensus When Defining Peace. It seems apparent that psychology can play a significant role in understanding and possibly providing direction for change regarding war. One path to understanding the concepts of war and peace is an exploration of the conceptualizations which support them both. I will be focusing on we/they attitudes as one underlying factor in war. Additionally, I will explore the relationship of these attitudes to peace. These will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

However, any attempt to study the concepts of war and peace is complicated by the nature of the subject. War and peace, and related concepts, are complex and attempts to define them become difficult. Concepts which are somewhat similar are often treated in the literature as if they are the same. Terms are used interchangeably, such as nuclear freeze, disarmament, and arms agreements; war, nuclear war, and conventional war; and international relations, world politics, and U.S.-Soviet relations. Caplan and Nelson (1973) discussed the importance of a clear and thoughtful definition of a problem for research and problem resolution. They demonstrated how the definition assigned to a problem

affects the questions asked and what is or is not done about that problem.

Several authors have dealt with the problem of defining peace (Alvik, 1968; Brock-Utne, 1985; Galtung, 1969, 1985; Mukherjee, 1978; Reardon, 1985). Staub (1988) separates psychological research into two categories which represent two different approaches to addressing the problems regarding war and peace. The research which fits in the first category advocates narrow and simple definitions of peace, as well as small attainable goals. This approach is consistent with Weick's (1984) "small wins" approach to problems. Weick argues that social problems, defined in large and complicated ways, create too much arousal for people to feel effective and powerful enough to make change. He also states that an orderly, step by step plan for change is not useful as each small change completely changes the problem environment. The second category proposed by Staub represents broader, more generalized approaches to peace research. It is an underlying belief in this research that peace is a broad and complex process that includes more than the absence of war. Thus the problem of we/they relationships will be addressed as it may contribute to the understanding of the complexity of war and peace.

First or Second Order Change. Watzlawick (1974) sheds a different light on the issue of problem definition. He explores the issue of change and breaks it down into "first

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order" and "second order" change. He also argues that the type of change that occurs will depend on the definition of the problem and the approach taken to solve the problem. A first order change is a change which effects a symptom of the problem, which frequently happens to be a previously tried solution which has failed (more nuclear weapons were seen as a solution to war, but are now seen by most as a problem). Change of the first order creates superficial change and the system remains similar, but with a new symptom to "solve." A second order change is focused at the system itself and will create profound change.

When Watzlawick's model is applied to nuclear issues, it appears that research, policy and activism take aim at both the first and second order levels of change. However, they tend to be more often at the first order level. Concerns which focus primarily on negotiating tactics and reduction or elimination of particular weapons are on the level of first order change. If these efforts were completely successful, we would be faced with new weapons and continued international conflict; we would have new symptoms to resolve. Approaches which attempt to deal on the level of second order change look at the "causes" of international conflict and violence and attempt to make change at that level. Profound change in the way human beings relate may help create a world where massive defense systems are unnecessary. It is the purpose of this

dissertation to take a small step in understanding the nature of how human beings perceive each other and the relationship of those perceptions to planned violence and peace.

Even problems of a smaller scale sometimes require both first and second order change. Given the enormity of the problems and potential dangers associated with nuclear weapons, both first and second order levels of change are essential. We must work to reduce the immediate risk of nuclear annihilation--eg. reduce the symptoms. At the same time, we must explore and apply knowledge on the second order level. First order change is more likely to create "small wins"--a sense of effectiveness and motivation. Research on the second order level is likely to bring clarity and direction to further research and efforts for change, and may eventually provide direction for "small wins" at the second order level. Staub (1988) addresses this issue when he states, "Both a long-term vision and limited goals are important [sic]" (p. 82).

The focus of this dissertation relates to the difficulty defining and creating peace. To do both we need to explore the underlying causes of intergroup conflict which may lead to planned violence against groups of people. Further understanding of these factors which contribute to acceptance of violence against groups will be helpful both in creating useful definitions of peace and in planning

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short-term, limited goals as well as long-term goals for the creation of peace. The concept of we/they relationships is the underlying factor on which I will focus.

Objective

My objective is to explore the nature of we/they relationships, which will be discussed fully below, and the relevance these relationships may have for second order change regarding planned violence against groups and the present state of world affairs. Planned violence, which will be shown in the next chapter to include violence acted directly or indirectly upon people, requires preparation, whether the violence is consciously or unconsciously understood by the perpetrator. In other words, impulsive, "heat of the moment" acts of violence are not a focus of this dissertation. Indirect violence (which will be defined below) and more direct forms of violence, such as war, will be considered.

In addition, I will be discussing the implications of these findings to defining peace in a manner which is broad and encompasses equality of all humans, acceptance of diversity, and an end to planned violence against any group of people. Proponents of broad definitions of peace contend that the absence of war cannot exist as long as these "other problems" continue (e.g., Brock-Utne, 1985; Reardon, 1985). I will focus on one proposed meta-factor which may underly all forms of prejudice and planned violence. This factor

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has been given several labels in the literature: we/they relationships (Keen, 1986; Saunders, 1987); in-group/out-group relationships (Allport, 1958; Sherif, 1966; Smith, 1987); stereotypes (Allport, 1958; Sherwood, 1980); and, at a more specific level, racism (Apostle, Glock & Piazza, & Suelzle, 1983; Bagley & Verma, 1979; Blauner, 1972; Sherwood, 1980), sexism (Brock-Utne, 1985; Reardon, 1985) and enemy images (Frank, 1982; Hesse, 1988; Keen, 1986; White, 1985). These are all labels for the tendency to define groups of people as different than one's own group, and, as a result of group membership alone, to make negative or positive attributions about the individuals within the group.

There are several theories (Erikson, 1985; Frank, 1982; Volkan, 1985; White, 1984) which address the need of human beings to maintain enemies and allies. However, there are also indications that human beings can experience group cohesiveness and a sense of belonging and meaning without devaluing other groups of people, or at least without inflicting harm on other groups (Allport, 1958; Capra, 1982; Gilligan, 1982; Keen, 1986; Peck, 1987).

Hypotheses

My hypotheses, which are explored in the literature review, are that the tendency to define relationships in terms of we/they consists of three components, 1) thinking of people in "other" groups as different, 2) feeling that

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people who are different are less valuable than those people seen as similar, and 3) perceiving people who are different as dangerous to one's own well-being. Additionally, I hypothesize that the tendency to devalue a group and see them as dangerous will positively correlate with acceptance of the use of planned violence of various forms against groups, including war.

Implications and Limitations

It is hoped the results of this study will provide understanding about the link between we/they relationships and the acceptance of various forms of planned violence against groups. If the results indicate there is a positive correlation between the tendency of an individual to conceptualize the world in terms of we/they relationships and the acceptance of planned violence, then the possibility of an underlying factor in all forms of violence will be supported. This finding will also support a broad definition of peace; a definition such as the absence of all forms of violence. If we/they relationships are found to be a factor common to the acceptance of direct and indirect violence against particular groups (e.g., ethnic groups), as well as the acceptance of war against enemy nations, then long range attempts to create peace will benefit from this understanding of we/they relationships both in terms of further research and plans for change. A common factor in the acceptance of planned violence would indicate that

narrow definitions of peace would focus on a limited aspect of the problem, such as war and other forms of violence. Alleviation of these symptoms would likely be temporary if approached at this level. A second order level of change would require a broader definition of the problem which includes all types of planned violence against groups, and a reduction in the negative aspects of we/they relationships. Proponents of broad definitions of peace would be supported in their claim that dealing with one issue while ignoring the others will only be effective on a surface level, will only deal with a symptom, ignoring other symptoms and the underlying cause.

This study can provide but a small step in teasing out the relationships and factors regarding peace, its definition, and the most effective approaches to studying and affecting change in international relations and the nuclear age. War and peace are complicated and abstract concepts which are related to many values, attitudes and human attributes. This dissertation will explore and clarify issues regarding definitions of peace, we/they relationships, and the acceptance of planned violence against groups.

In addition, this dissertation will provide a much needed empirical evaluation of the link between one way human beings relate (i.e., we/they relationships) and the acceptance of planned violence. An understanding of this

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link may change the direction of further research in the area of peace studies and the important work of peace-building.

The next section will include a review of the literature regarding definitions of peace which include the absence of all planned violence, the components of we/they relationships, and two specific forms of we/they relationships: racism and nationalism.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to understand the relationship of we/they
attitudes to planned violence and war, in particular, a more
thorough understanding of these concepts is necessary. In
this section I will begin with a review of the literature
regarding definitions of peace, and the importance of
understanding this broader concept as more than the absence
of war. This discussion leads directly to an exploration of
we/they relationships as one possible underlying factor in
racism and nationalism, and a factor in the acceptance of
planned violence against any group. The proposed central
importance of we/they relationships would indicate the need
for definitions of peace which take into consideration the
way human beings relate in order to produce meaningful
research and action.

Broad Definitions of Peace Which Include Planned Violence

In this section I will briefly review the various
definitions of peace as they have been discussed in the
literature. The broad definitions of peace will be

emphasized as they include justice, equality, and lack of oppression--concepts which are directly related to we/they relationships and the acceptance of planned violence against the "other" groups.

Defining peace is complicated by culture and language differences. Mukherjee (1978) points out that the Indian language has three concepts which he considers comparable to the English term "peace." Sylvester (1980) defined peace as "a concern to alleviate warlike conflict or the threat thereof as a mode of international problem-solving" (p. 308). Keen (1986) quotes an United States military manual as unfortunately defining peace as "permanent pre-hostility" (p. 87). Cooper (1965) argued that the term peace rarely symbolizes a vigorous active striving for international understanding and cooperation.

In an attempt to bring some order to the subject, Johnson (1976) identified three schools of peace studies, each with a different definition of peace. The traditional school defines peace as "the absence of warlike conflict and violence or the threat thereof" (p. 5). Galtung (1967) is representative of proponents of the second school in that he defines peace as the absence of both direct violence, such as war and killing, and structural violence. Structural violence is defined as indirect violence--i.e., violence which is created and occurs as a result of some institutions and social structures. It is not as obviously and quickly

destructive as direct violence, but does harm to people nonetheless. A structurally violent setting is one in which individuals may do much harm to other human beings by just performing their regular duties at a job defined in the structure (Galtung 1985). Examples of structural violence may include poverty, homelessness, hunger, and infant mortality. Falk (1971) represents the third school, which is the most broad and controversial, when he defines peace as "isomorphic with global health" (p. 86) (economically, politically, socially, and environmentally).

Gilbert (1988) discusses this conflict among peace activists and researchers between general and conceptual approaches, or specific and focused approaches. He points out that for generalists the goal of ending nuclear war and broader efforts to achieve social justice are indivisible, and as a result may increase the appeal for many people to get involved in peace activism. Generalists also work at a deeper conceptual level than proponents of a more focused objective who emphasize the advantage of "small wins" (Weick, 1984). Both arguments make common sense and find support in the literature, and Gilbert concludes, "In sum, both the general and the focused approach to goal setting in the peace movement have potential advantages" (p. 761).

The broader definitions of peace give direction to the search for a conceptually deeper understanding of peace, which is an objective of this dissertation. Reardon (1985)

stated, "Positive peace is the conditions of justice and equity necessary to achieve the absence of war," (p. 60) and she goes on to state that war and sexism are manifestations of the same underlying cause, and are both perpetuated by oppression and violence, therefore demanding simultaneous attention. UNESCO (1977) declared "the struggle for peace and actions which promote human rights are inseparable," and therefore peace is not only the absence of war but the presence of justice. Wagner (1988) makes an argument for a positive definition of peace and positive means of obtaining peace based on the lack of creative and moral solutions produced by more negative definitions of peace.

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (1985) defines peace as "respect for the sovereignty of nations and the right to a just share of the world's resources" (p. 2). As a result, they have set broad goals which include ending legal restrictions and sexist attitudes that limit women, and economically oppressive barriers which block all people.

Brock-Utne (1985) defines peace in a manner which includes equality of all members of a society and the absence of direct and indirect (structural), internal and external violence.

Staub (1988) concludes,

The history of war--ingrained in the relations
of groups--combined with the existence of nuclear
weapons, requires that we work to create cultures,

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social institutions, and a system of relations
among nations that diminish the likelihood of
antagonism, hostility, and their expression in
armed conflict. (p. 81)

Staub draws a connection between the relations of groups
(i.e. we/they attitudes) and war. He believes the benefits
of changing the way humans relate will motivate people to
act to diminish nuclear war--benefits such as less violence
of any kind between groups, greater human connectedness, and
more caring and cooperation.

In summary, these broad definitions of peace include
all forms of planned violence against groups. Direct
violence (i.e., physical assault), indirect or structural
violence (i.e, oppression, poverty, inequality and
injustice) and war must all be eliminated in order to create
peace according to these broad definitions.

These are lofty and important goals; goals worth
working toward. It is the thesis of this dissertation that
in order to diminish planned violence between all groups, we
must first understand the links between perceptions of
"others", the value we place on "others," and the use of
planned violence. Are there factors which underly all
planned violence against groups of people regardless of the
group? One possible factor is we/they relationships.

We/They Relationships

The question of how best to define peace (i.e, in a
broad way which requires all planned violence be eliminated)

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and the concept of we/they relationships are central to this dissertation. I will focus on we/they relationships as one possible common factor in planned violence against groups of people, and two forms of we/they relationships in particular--racism and nationalism--as examples. In this section I will divide we/they relationships into possible components, review possible processes necessary to sustain them, and explore their possible effects.

Definition. I would like to comment first on my choice of terminology. Interestingly, as various authors have explored the phenomenon of we/they relationships, they have fallen into the trap of using phraseology based on stereotypes to describe the phenomenon. White (1985) thoughtfully pointed out that the common usage of black (them) and white (us) in the literature perpetuates racial stereotypes by relating black to the "they" image which is primarily evil, and white to the "we" image which is primarily good. He suggested the terms "Good Guys" and "Bad Guys" be substituted. However, in the interest of avoiding sexist language, and with the recognition that there are also "Good Girl" and "Bad Girl" images which must be explored, I have chosen the terms we/they relationships or, when more appropriate, in-group/out-group relationships instead.

In addition, the terms attitude and perception are used interchangeably. Perception is used as it has been in

social Psychology (i.e., White, 1984) to mean a view or image rather than a sensation.

What are we/they relationships? They are a phenomenon which is intrapersonal, interpersonal, and societal. In their most benign form we/they relationships are characterized by the perception of oneself as a member of a group which includes some people who are seen as similar, and the perception of some other people as somehow different and therefore members of another group. Many feel that this process of differentiating groups of people is a basic human tendency (Frank, 1982; Staub, 1988; White, 1985; Volkan, 1985; Reardon, 1985). In theory, we/they relationships can be a harmless or even helpful way of ordering a complicated world.

However, it is the we/they relationships which appear to result in polarized representations of one's self (good) and the "other" (bad) which will be the focus here. It is these relationships which are proposed to result in racism and nationalism. For the remainder of this dissertation the term we/they relationships will be used to describe these polarized representations in which otherness connotes "hierarchies of human worth" (Reardon, 1985). In these hierarchies people who are seen as different are considered less valuable and often dangerous. Therefore, I propose a model of we/they relationships which includes cognitive expression of these attitudes--the tendency to separate

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people into groups, some of which are defined as different, and the affective expression of we/they attitudes--the tendency to devalue those perceived as different, and to see them as dangerous. I will argue that it is these relationships which contribute to planned violence against groups of people.

Erikson (1966) discussed this phenomenon in the following:

> Man has evolved (by whatever kind of evolution or whatever adaptive reasons) in pseudospecies, i.e., tribes, clans, classes, etc., which behave as if they were separate species, created at the beginning of time by supernatural intent. (p. 606)

Erikson (1985) later relates this phenomenon directly to a specific form of we/they relationships (nationalism) which will be discussed below.

Several authors have empirically explored the tendency to differentiate groups. In their classic study, the Sherifs and their colleagues (1961) separated 11-year-old boys at a summer camp into two groups who were isolated from each other for eight days. They were then brought together under conditions designed to maximize competition and mutual frustration. Observers recorded anecdotes and overt behaviors between the two groups. Controlled measures of sociometric preferences and evaluative trait ratings were administered to the boys. Estimates of performance by the group members during the competitive task were also completed. On each indicator the boys revealed bias

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favoring members of their own group over members of the outgroup. In the final phase the boys were asked to complete a task which required the two groups to work cooperatively in order to complete the task successfully. A reduction in bias toward one's own group was demonstrated in this last phase. Diab (1970) was able to replicate these results in a Lebanese setting.

Tajfel (1981) and his students discovered their subjects tended to categorize themselves into "us" and "others" when they were given even "the flimsiest, most arbitrary excuse for doing so" (p. 243). Their subjects also predictably tended to place greater value on "us" and less value on "them." For example Tajfel et. al. (1971) broke college students into groups based on preference for modern painters in one phase (Klee or Kandinsky), or perception of clusters of dots on a page in another phase. The subjects had no interaction with each other, did not know who the other subjects were, and were asked to make choices which were of no personal benefit to themselves. The subjects were asked to allocate money to two other subjects, whom they did not meet. The subjects asked to allocate the money were provided information regarding which group they were assigned to, as well as the group membership of the subjects to which they were to allocate money. Subjects consistently favored those within their own group. Subjects in their own group were consistently given more

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money. Tajfel and his students, and Brewer (1978) replicated this study several times. During these replications the possibilities for allocating the money were varied. Subjects in one phase would be allowed to give equal amounts to the other two subjects--fifteen dollars to each--and in another phase they would be forced to give one subject more than the other--subjects had to divide fifteen dollars between two people without being able to use change, and thus one received more than the other. The authors continuously found this bias favoring one's own group. Even in trials in which equal allocation was a possibility, subjects tended to give more money to members of their own group.

Rabbie and Wilkens (1971) also used college students who were divided into groups of three. These groups were then paired with other groups and were asked to evaluate their own group members and the other group members on a six item evaluative trait scale. During the interaction phase which followed, the groups either worked with their own group with no interaction with their paired group, worked with their own group in no competition with their paired group, or worked with their own group in competition with their paired group. They were then asked to complete the evaluative trait measure again. All groups tended to slightly favor their ingroup prior to the interaction phase; however, the competitive and noncompetitive groups

significantly favored their own group following the interaction phase. The authors then completed a manipulation check and found that the members of the competitive and noncompetitive groups felt equally competitive. Therefore, the noncompetitive and competitive distinctions in this study did not hold up. However, the groups who did see themselves in competition clearly developed stronger in-group bias.

In a previous study, Rabbie and Horwitz (1964) found that arbitrary assignment of groups to a blue and green category produced no significant bias, but when a chance allocation rule was introduced whereby one group won a prize, subjects in both groups showed a significant bias in favor of their own group in the evaluative trait ratings. Therefore, it appears that distinction of groups alone does not create ingroup bias. However, various forms of competition or perceived competition, which include scarce resources and a necessary winner and loser, appear to contribute to bias between groups.

For a more detailed review of the literature in this area see Tajfel (1982). He points out people experience a great deal of satisfaction from feelings of connection and unity whether as "a Red Sox fan, a member of a student body, or as Americans retaliating against Libyans" (p. 5).

Other research has shown that we/they relationships may or may not coexist with a sense of interconnectedness with

humanity as a whole. Love of one's own group may not require hate of the outgroup. For example, Conover and Feldman (1981) administered questionnaires to a general population sample and college students. The questionnaire evaluated various policy preferences, as well as like and dislike of liberals and conservatives. For the general sample, they found no significant correlation between like and dislike of the liberals and conservatives. They interpreted this as denial of bipolarity; for the mass public, "favoring one side does not mean opposing the other" (p. 637). They did find a significant correlation (-.60) between like of one group and dislike of the other group among college graduates. The authors concluded that the better educated sample "understand that liking one means disliking the other" (p. 638). However, increased understanding of complex issues may increase ambiguity. Several authors (Berriman, 1964; Keen, 1986; McClosky, 1967; Staub, 1988) have proposed that polarized thinking increases with increased ambiguity. Therefore, Conover and Feldman's (1981) conclusion that better educated subjects hold more realistic polarized images needs further examination.

Johnson and Friedman (1989) administered questionnaires to an adult sample of the Southern California region. Their questionnaires contained several scales including acceptance of war, attitudes regarding the environment, spirituality, autonomy, and acceptance of structural violence. Most

pertinent to this discussion were their scales regarding like or dislike of the in-group and the out-group. Sample items include, "It's difficult to like people who are different from me" (out-group scale) and "I'm proud to be a member of my racial group" (in-group scale). They found a low non-significant correlation between love of the in-group and dislike of the out-group (-.09). In other words, it appears there is no relationship between the attitudes held toward one's own group and the attitudes held toward the "other" group.

The problem has also been approached through empirical exploration of personality attributes which correlate with a tendency to categorize people into groups and to view them as separate and different. A word of caution is in order regarding this approach. Studies which focus on the individual tend to find those who are most polarized in their thinking about people and those who are least polarized, and then attempt to explain how they got that way. A value judgment may be implied; unpolarized thinking is good, and the others may be considered "bad." A focus is placed on how those with the most polarized attitudes could be "fixed." The problem with this approach is that we/they attitudes are most likely on a continuum rather than an either/or phenomenon. In addition, it seems most likely that multiple causes contribute to we/they thinking, not the least of which is hierarchical systems which place varying

values on human beings. Therefore, placing blame on those who are more polarized in their thinking than others seems inappropriate and unhelpful. However, these studies, when interpreted with caution, provide useful information regarding we/they relationships.

McClosky (1967) found that "isolationist attitudes," defined as disengagement from other nations or a strong orientation toward one's in-group, are part of a larger network of attitudes which stretches across domains other than foreign policy. McClosky conducted three major studies: A cross-sample of the population of Minnesota (n=1082), a national cross-section survey of 1484 respondents, and a mail survey of 3020 Democratic and Republican leaders who were delegates to the 1956 national party conventions. Large batteries of self-administered attitude and personality scales included 70 scales and nearly 550 items. However, the questionnaires administered to each subject pool were somewhat different, as "only" 45 scales were administered to any one subject. Therefore, the three data sets are not entirely comparable. A nine-item isolationist scale was administered to each group. The relationship of isolationist attitudes to numerous other factors was then explored. McClosky found that a network of attitudes related to isolationist attitudes is held together by a "fundamentally aversive psychological temper, a disposition to reject, to punish, to eliminate, and to

control what is unfamiliar, foreign, unusual, or threatening" (p. 65). He goes on to discuss possible explanations for the correlation. McClosky found that those who were high in isolationist attitudes experienced acute discomfort with ambiguity and uncertainty and tended to hold more polarized views, prematurely reach cognitive closure, and selectively attend to stimuli. In addition, these same subjects held a preference for familiar people and things (in-group) which McClosky labeled ethnocentrism. This definition of ethnocentrism is similar to we/they relationships but focuses primarily on like of one's own group rather than preference of the in-group over the out-group (in-group/out-group).

Adorno et al. (1950) approached the problem through an exploration of the "authoritarian personality" and found that Anti-Semitism and strong ethnic prejudice, forms of differentiating and devaluing outgroups, correlate with repressed aggression and hostility. Altemeyer (1981, 1988) and Smith (1987) also came to similar conclusions.

Hermann (1987) reviewed the literature on conservatives and found they are more likely to be anxious, lacking in self-esteem, hostile, and psychologically inflexible. These factors are presumed to impede the development of a tolerant open mind and, instead encourage an intolerant and punitive stance (Adorno, et al., 1950; Sniderman, 1975; Stone, 1980; Wilson, 1973; as discussed in Hermann, 1987). This

intolerant and punitive stance appears to be the same as the interpersonal stance taken in we/they relationships.

Deutsch (1973) delineated three basic personality types through the use of the "prisoner dilemma". These personality types appear to fall along the continuum of we/they attitudes and therefore provide further understanding of the nature of these attitudes. In the "prisoner dilemma" two people are asked to decide what they would do if they were both prisoners who had committed a crime together. They are given the choice of confessing or keeping quiet, and the severity of their punishment depends both on their choice and that of the other prisoner. The possibilities are that they are both better off, both worse off, or one is better off and the other worse off.

The basic personality types Deutsch found included cooperative, individualistic, and competitive. The cooperative personality type had a positive interest in the welfare of others as well as their own welfare. If this typology were extended to groups, the cooperative personality would be expected to have a positive sense of connectedness with their own group as well as other groups, and to care about the welfare of all groups. The individualistic personality type is described as having an interest in doing as well as possible for themselves, and not caring, one way or the other for the welfare of others. When people with this personality type extend their identity

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to include certain groups (a process called ethnocentrism), they would feel connected to their own group and not others, and therefore would not feel any concern for members outside their own group. The competitive personality type was interested in doing better than others, and as well as they possibly could for themselves. When people of this personality type generalize their identity to include a group identity they would be expected to feel concern for members of their own group, and not only want them to do well, but want them to do better than members of other groups.

Deutsch found that cooperative styles consistently led to better resolutions. Therefore it appears that those subjects who experienced a positive sense of connection with other subjects were able to find the most positive solution to the dilemma. However, a careful examination of the various solutions to the dilemma is necessary to assure the results are not a product of the design of the dilemma. In addition, it appears that the personality types are not pure and the decisions made may vary based on situational factors which should be explored further.

In order to understand we/they relationships I will apply the practice of dividing attitudes into components, which is often applied in attitude research, to we/they relationships in the following section.

A Model of We/They Relationships. Abelson (1988)

proposed that attitudes be divided into three components, a "tripartite distinction" between the cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. Apostle et al. (1983) stated prejudice can be measured in degree and kind across three forms of expression. Cognitively, it is the harboring of negative beliefs (stereotypes) about an out-group. Affectively, it is negative feelings about members of the out-group. Prejudice is expressed conatively through the willingness to engage in discriminatory behavior toward members of the out-group. Tajfel (1982) stated the two necessary components of in-group/out-group identification are 1) cognitive, the sense of awareness of membership, and 2) evaluative, the sense that this awareness is related to some value connotations. Tajfel goes on to propose two functions of "social accentuation." The cognitive function, resulting in the accentuation of similarities and differences, is the utilization of categories to classify, order, systematize and simplify the complex network of social groups. The value function results in more emphatic accentuation of these same similarities and differences when associated with varying values applied to social categories.

I will apply this model of cognitive, affective, and behavioral expression of attitudes to we/they relationships in this section. Specifically, I will discuss the tendency to define groups as different (cognitive) and as less

valuable and dangerous (affective), and the relationship of these components to acceptance of violence (behavior). These factors are central to the hypotheses of this dissertation.

Several authors (Keen, 1986; McClosky, 1967; Staub, 1988) focus on the human needs for clarity and lack of ambiguity as possible contributing factors to the cognitive component of we/they relationships (different). These authors emphasize the need to order the complex world, to create categories, to simplify and to maintain self assurance about the accuracy of these simplified categories. As complexity and stress increase, the need for order also appears to increase, according to these authors.

The human needs for clarity, and intolerance of ambiguity appear to be factors which contribute to the tendency to differentiate groups. Therefore, the tendency to perceive others as different has been specified as a cognitive component of we/they relationships. Staub (1988) points out that members of the outgroup have behaviors, habits, beliefs, and values that are different than our own. In response to this unknown, this ambiguity, they are often feared, disliked, and devalued. According to Keen (1986), "The hostile imagination begins with a simple but crippling assumption: what is strange or unknown is dangerous and intends us evil" (p. 18). Berriman (1964) also applies the concepts of fear and assumptions about the unknown to

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international relations:

> ...mutual anxiety at the international level
> is at its greatest when each country knows enough
> about the other country to know they can inflict
> harm, but does not know enough to be sure of its
> intent or of how much power it actually has. (p. 9)

As a people we attempt to combat the anxiety by reducing uncertainty, by being sure of ourselves. Without enough information to make informed judgments this appears to lead to oversimplified and polarized thinking, to either/or, to we/they relationships. As Keen (1986) states,

> Our focus narrows, our categories harden until
> we see the whole world through the lens of our
> struggle. All people are reduced to allies or
> foes. (p. 108)

Allport (1958) stresses that prejudging is a "normal" occurrence. In fact, orderly living depends on our ability to form categories. Allport defines category as an "accessible cluster of associated ideas which as a whole has the property of funding daily adjustments" (p. 166). In other words, without categories our world would be very confusing, each new stimulus or experience would require a complete "evaluation" to understand and plan how to act. Allport goes on to propose that categorization assimilates as much as it can to the cluster and saturates all that it contains with the same ideational and emotional flavor. He states that the difference between a prejudiced and non-prejudiced person is the amount of differentiation in the categories. Prejudiced people tend to dichotomize, think

simplistically, and cannot tolerate ambiguity. Tolerant personalities readily admit ignorance, and are habitually skeptical about either/or categories. However, a distinction between groups of people who have or do not have we/they relationships is rather artificial as people fall on a continuum of prejudice rather than into prejudiced and non-prejudiced categories.

The Cognitive Component of We/They Relationships: Others as Different. The tendency to categorize and perceive "others" as different is the first component of the proposed model of we/they relationships. According to Allport, the separation of people into groups helps maintain one's own identity, makes daily adjustment easier, and helps avoid the "trouble" of learning new languages and cultures. However, groups of people who are separate are usually left with few channels for communication, and often the degree of differences between the groups becomes exaggerated. In addition, Allport states separateness leads to genuine conflicts of interest.

The empirical evidence, which was reviewed earlier, supports Allport's proposals that separation of people into groups is a very common human tendency and is often done based on rather unimportant differences such as perception of dots on a page, or preference for modern painters (Brewer, 1978; Tajfel et al., 1971). However, Rabbie and Horwitz (1964) demonstrated quite clearly that the

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separation of people into groups did not create in-group bias unless competition was created between the groups. Therefore, it appears that the perception of competition between groups is an essential factor in order for subjects' perceptions to change from separateness to in-group bias, which is often referred to as misperception (e.g., White, 1984). It appears to be possible that the tendency to define groups of people as different could occur in another social system and not lead to misperception. Western society, which is structured such that people must compete for resources (Schaef, 1987), provides fertile ground for in-group bias and misperceptions of both the in-group and the out-group.

In regards to the hypotheses of this dissertation, it appears that the tendency to differentiate between groups is an essential factor in we/they relationships but is not sufficient alone to create the biases and misperceptions which are proposed to lead to acceptance of violence. Therefore, it would be expected that the tendency to define people as different would have to be present in order for someone to accept the use of violence against another group. However, the tendency to differentiate alone would not be sufficient. Additionally, someone must devalue the out-group, and most likely see them as dangerous, in order to accept the use of violence against them.

Several authors have completed empirical studies

regarding perception based on in-group/out-group distinctions. For example, Hensley and Duval (1976, as reported in Tajfel, 1982) split subjects into two groups and then had them complete attitude questionnaires which were designed to assess 1) their own attitudes, 2) the attitudes they felt their own group members held, and 3) the attitudes they perceived members of the out-group held. The authors report the subjects accentuated the similarities in attitudes of members within their own group, and the differences in the attitudes of members of the out-group. A similar study (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman, 1978) reported college students who were separated into groups tended to accentuate similarities within their own group and differences between themselves and the out-group based on observations of the group by trained observers. Doise et al. (1972) and Doise and Sinclair (1973) were able to replicate these findings with Swiss linguistic groups, and with groups of boys and girls. Therefore, these studies support the proposition that subjects tend to perceive members of their own group as similar and members of the "other" group as different.

There is a wealth of theoretical and empirical research which focuses on the cognitive processes involved in we/they relationships. Contributions in this area have come from cognitively oriented psychology, particularly attribution theory (Deaux & Enswiller, 1976; Duncan, 1976; Feldman-

Summers & Kiesler, 1974; Hamilton & Rose, 1978; Zadney & Gerard, 1974), group psychology (Janis, 1972), social psychology (Deutsch, 1973, Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986), studies of racial stereotypes (Allport, 1958; Apostle et al., 1983; Sherwood, 1980) and international relations (Beyond War, 1985; Glossop, 1983; Keen, 1986; Mandel, 1986; Moyer, 1985; White, 1984). These authors focus on such processes as the accentuation of good aspects of "us" and bad aspects of "them" (Glossop, 1983; Moyer, 1985; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986; White, 1984); filtering of incoming information (Beyond War, 1985; Moyer, 1985), sometimes termed selective perception or selective inattention (Allport, 1958; Keen, 1986; White, 1984); distortion of information (Allport, 1958; Keen, 1986; Moyer, 1985); biased interpretation of behavior (Apostle et al., 1983; Deaux & Enswiller, 1976; Duncan, 1976; Feldman, Summers & Kiesler, 1974; Heider, 1958; Jones and Nisbett, 1972; White, 1984); selective recall of information (Allport, 1958; Hamilton & Rose, 1978; Keen, 1986; Moyer, 1985; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978; Zadney & Gerard, 1974); and cognitive consistency, forcing perceptions to fit previous images (Deutsch, 1973; George, 1980; Janis & Mann, 1977; Lebow, 1981; Sherwood, 1980). (Also see Murray and Abramson (1983) for a review of cognitive processes in stereotype bias).

As this dissertation does not focus on the processes by which distortions occur, but rather the relationship between

we/they thinking and acceptance of violence, this body of
literature will not be reviewed in detail. However, the
difficulty correcting misperceptions should be emphasized.
Allport (1958) reported,

> It is easier, someone has said, to smash an
> atom than a prejudice. (p. ix)

Allport goes on to say that if a person is capable of
rectifying his or her erroneous judgments in light of new
evidence, he or she is not prejudiced. Therefore, there are
numerous processes which provide a great deal of resistance
to any change in images of the in-group and the out-group.

In summary, this section has reviewed the cognitive
expression of we/they relationships, the tendency to
separate people into groups and define some groups as
different. It appears that the differentiation of groups
of people, without competition, does not lead to violence
against the group. However, it does appear that these group
distinctions and the misperceptions which follow are
necessary in order for the other components of we/they
relationships to occur--devaluing some groups of people and
perceiving them as dangerous. The link between the
cognitive component and the affective components of we/they
relationships will be discussed briefly.

The misperception of people is basically a stereotype.
Stereotype, as defined by Allport (1958), is "an exaggerated
belief associated with a category. Its function is to

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justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that category" (p. 185). Allport goes on to state that stereotypes are not a full explanation of rejection, as some stereotypes exist with no negative feelings. This is further support for the hypothesis that more than cognitive differentiation is required in order to accept planned violence against groups.

The process of misperceiving in-group and out-group members is widely accepted in the literature. Its acceptance appears to be based primarily on "common sense" and extrapolation from the large body of literature regarding the relationship of increased stress, threat, or fear on effective cognitive processing of information. In addition, there is research which links the tendency to define people as different to more evaluative responses such as the belief that people of different groups are less valuable, and even dangerous. As Tajfel (1981) states,

> The phenomena of depersonalization, dehumanization, and social stereotyping which tend to increase in scope as and when intergroup relations deteriorate are no more than special instances of this wider principle of the increased undifferentiation of the out-group. (p. 243)

The tendency to first define people as different, and then to devalue those who are different, was also discussed by Mandel (1986). He states that members of the in-group view members of the out-group through their own "cultural filters," and as a result regard the in-group as superior

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and the out-group as inferior and contemptible. This tendency to move beyond differentiation among people and subsequently to place value judgments is important to the thesis of this dissertation.

Affective Components of We/They Relationships: Less Valuable and Dangerous. The emotional, or affective, "need" for we/they relationships is the focus of several theories. These theories address two specific components of the model of we/they relationships: The tendency to devalue those perceived as different, and the tendency to experience those who are seen as different as threatening. These theories include projection of self-attributes onto others (Allport, 1958; Greening, 1986; Keen, 1986; Jung, 1964; Mack, 1988; Sherwood, 1980; Reardon, 1985), xenophobia (Frank, 1982; Keen, 1986; Pinderhughes, 1982; Staub, 1988), and ethnocentrism (Druckman, 1968; Kelman, 1986; Levine & Campbell, 1972; Smith, 1987; Sumner, 1906; Volkan, 1985, 1988; White, 1984). I will briefly review these theories.

Allport (1958) defines projection as "the tendency to attribute falsely to other people motives or traits that are our own, or that in some way explain or justify our own" (p. 360). Guilt, fear, anger, greed, sadism, hostility, and lust are often transferred to other people, because they are too threatening or unacceptable to the person or people experiencing them. The concept of splitting is often used in conjunction with projection (Allport, 1958; Keen, 1986;

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Sherwood, 1980). Splitting, a term borrowed from the psychoanalytic literature, (St. Clair, 1986) refers to the process in which the good aspects of a person or group, such as righteousness or purity, are kept for themselves, and the bad aspects, such as hostility and evil, are projected onto the "screen" which in we/they relationships is the out-group. According to Reardon (1985), the enemy becomes the "embodiment of what we fear or reject in ourselves" (p. 7). Thus projection is proposed to lead to perceptions of the "other" as bad and/or dangerous.

Jung (1964) proposed that all humans have evil components which are harbored in the "shadow," a theorized construct which is believed to be one aspect of the basic human personality. However, Jung hypothesized that some people find the prospect of coming face-to-face with evil within themselves too frightening, and therefore they project the shadow outside of themselves, usually onto other people or supernatural forces. Jung applied this theory directly to we/they relationships, and to the United States and its international relationships in particular, in the following:

> What he fails to see is that it is his own vices
> which he has covered up by good international
> manners that are thrown back in his face by the
> communist world, shamelessly and methodically.
> What the West has tolerated, but secretly and with
> a slight sense of shame (the diplomatic lie,
> systematic deception, veiled threats), comes back
> into the open and in full measure from the East and
> ties us up in neurotic knots. It is the face of

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his own evil shadow that grins at Western man from
the other side of the Iron Curtain... (p. 85)

Keen (1986) called wars ritual "shadow dramas in which
we continually try to kill those parts of ourselves we deny
and despise" (p. 11). Other authors have explored the
process of mutual projection between the United States and
the Soviet Union by comparing similar incidents which
occurred between the two countries. They then discuss the
various explanations given by both countries for the
incidents. The explanations are amazingly similar, and
usually assume ill intentions on the part of the other
country, but only pure intentions for their own country's
actions (Mack, 1988; White, 1984). Greening (1986) has
developed a Soviet-American Relations Attitude Scale (SARAS)
which consists of 31 items to which Americans were asked to
respond (Likert-scale) to statements regarding the Soviet
Union and Soviet people. Following the survey there is a
summary page which states,

> This is a trick questionnaire. All of the
> statements are opinions expressed by Soviets,
> mostly about Americans or the West.

He goes on to provide various quotations from Soviet and
American leaders which clearly depict the "mirror-image
problem in Soviet-American relations."

Allport (1958) points out that in order for projection
to occur repression is also necessary. The inner,
insightful, perception of the situation must be blocked or

repressed. Then people in out-groups become "living inkblots...at night, when objects are shadowy, projection of fear is easier" (p. 363). In other words, those we do not know enough about to see clearly are the most likely targets of the projection.

The process of projection is central in Keen's (1986) exploration of enemy images throughout history. He suggests that we consider our enemy images a mirror and "own" the side of ourselves we see in the mirror. We should take responsibility for our actions rather than blame others for their actions or intentions.

The application of the theory of projection of one's own attributes onto others as a factor in international relations is an example of applying knowledge regarding the individual personality to group relations. At best this practice is questionable and does not find support in the literature. Authors who have recently written about this problem include Blight (1987), Jacobs (1989), Jordan (1963), and Kahn et al. (1983). They evaluate the possibility that this tendency among psychologists to apply knowledge about the individual to international relations has rendered their efforts all but useless. Although I have argued above against the conclusion that application of psychology to peace studies is useless, I agree that we must move beyond an understanding of the individual and recognize that societal and group mechanisms are, at least in some ways, if

not essentially, different from individual behaviors and motivations. Therefore, the application of projection to group processes and international relations should be considered tentative, and empirical research in this area is strongly indicated. It is the proposed outcomes of projection which will be studied here (the tendency to perceive "others" as less valuable and dangerous).

The term xenophobia was also borrowed from psychoanalytic literature and applied to we/they relationships. Jerome Frank (1982) stated the tendency to define others as enemies stems from humans' innate fear of strangers. Staub (1988) explains that the "basic human tendency" to differentiate between "us," members of the ingroup, and "them", members of outgroups, has its roots in human genetic makeup. The human infant develops affectional ties called attachments to primary caretakers and negative reactions to strangers, called "stranger anxiety." Both attachments and stranger anxiety vary in intensity and nature based on the infants' life experiences. Infants who spend time with a greater variety of people tend to show less stranger anxiety. Therefore, we would expect the intensity and nature of we/they thinking to also vary based on the experiences of the individual.

Pinderhughes (1982) describes a similar theory which also focuses on the bonding tendencies of infants. He states there is "A-bonding" in which the infant develops an

"affiliative-affectionate" bond with an object (mental representation of a person). "D-bonding" is a "differential-aggressive" bond to the mental representation of another. He proposes this tendency persists throughout adult life. Therefore, humans have affiliative and affectionate bonds to certain ideas and people, and aggressive, divisive bonds to others. He concludes that discrimination and paranoid process are universal.

Keen (1986) also states that these processes are universal and are even considered honorable:

> It is considered both normal and admirable,
> the essence of tribal loyalty and patriotism,
> to direct vitriolic hatred toward strangers
> we hardly know, and to reserve love for those
> familiar to us. (p. 17)

Therefore, these authors propose there is group pressure to hold negative feelings toward strangers.

Specifically, xenophobia is proposed to contribute to perceived fear (threat) of the "other." However, the application of xenophobia to group relations is purely theoretical. It seems likely that this tendency is a universal human capacity (rather than an innate drive) which implies choice, and thus the ability to create significant change in we/they attitudes. In addition, the criticism regarding application of individual personality theory to group mechanisms is relevant to xenophobia. Therefore, this application should be made with caution. Further research is necessary to clarify the nature of the relationship

between xenophobia and we/they attitudes.

It is proposed that anxiety, fear, and even hatred of the "other" may lead to a cyclical process of self-fulfilling prophecy (Hermann, 1987; White, 1984). As each side becomes more suspicious of the other, it becomes more secretive and self-protective. Each side is then provided even less information about the other side, and so stereotypes and misperceptions go unchallenged.

White (1984) discusses how generalized anxiety on the part of the Soviets and Americans results in this kind of cycle. As each one fears the other, they become more secretive and build arms to protect themselves. The other sees this behavior as proof that their fears were justified. "They must mean us harm. Why else would they be so secretive and build up arms? It certainly cannot be because we have threatened them. We were acting in self-defense" (p. 174).

Keen (1986) put it this way:

Paranoia creates a self-fulfilling
prophecy, a vicious circle in which suspicion
builds suspicion, threat breeds counterthreat.
Passive-aggressive victims bring on themselves
the aggression they obsessively fear. (p. 23)

In our international relations the United States and the Soviet Union can both be seen as passive-aggressive. We do not directly attack each other, but we make hostile statements and try to outsmart each other and "get away" with things. This type of behavior results in similar

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treatment and an escalation of the anxiety and fear, which leads to more secrecy and arms build up, and so on. "Ill will is self-perpetuating" (Beyond War, 1985 p. 9).

Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) discuss the process this way:

> ...the participants become enmeshed in a web
> of interactions and defensive-offensive
> maneuvers that worsen instead of improve their
>
> situations, making them more insecure,
> vulnerable, and burdened. (p. 78)

Sherwood (1980) discusses this cyclical process in terms of racism. He points out that the cycle can be "benign" or "vicious." Osgood (1962) developed a technique based on the proposition of a more positive cycle. "Graduated Reduction In Tensions (GRIT)" is a process by which nations act in a trusting manner. They make small moves to reduce arms, for example, which should result in a similar move on the part of the other nation. The first nation then feels more trusting and can take another step, and so on.

Another theory which has been applied to we/they relationships is ethnocentrism. Sumner (1906) coined the term ethnocentrism to describe the attitude of hostility and suspicion toward members of the out-group by members of the in-group. Since then, ethnocentrism has become a central feature in the work of many authors regarding racism and nationalism.

More recent definitions of ethnocentrism focus on its relationship to individual identity. The marking off process, the process of defining we and they, becomes important to an individual's definition of who and what they are personally. It helps provide direction for the meaning of human existence, the nature of social institutions, the conduct of human relationships, and the definition of the ideal personality (Kelman, 1986). In further defining ethnocentrism and national identity Kelman states:

> It represents identification with a population that is spread out over a wide geographical area--often, in fact, dispersed across the world--and to which a person feels a sense of belonging and closeness quite apart from any experience or expectation of personal contact. Moreover, this object of identification extends backward and forward in time. (p. 16)

Other authors expand the definition and understanding of ethnocentrism. White (1984) points out that territory becomes intertwined with self image: "The territory is perceived as part of the national self" (p. 152). Just as clothes are felt to be part of the person, so are the lands felt to be part of the nation. Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) stress that likes and dislikes are often based on ideological identification and closeness. Therefore, ethnocentrism includes all those ideas, possessions, traits, and cultural aspects which become intertwined with self and national or ethnic identity. Thus, ethnocentrism is similar to the concept of we/they relationships but focuses on the

overvaluation of one's own group rather than preference for one's own group over the "other" group.

Some authors feel ethnocentrism is a "universal psychological syndrome" (Druckman, 1968). Smith (1987) feels this "bed-rock basis for inter-group polarization and even enmity is likely to be the least amenable to change" (p. 5).

Volkan (1985), probably the most outspoken author regarding the human "need" to have enemies, focuses on the development of self-identity. He proposes that infants must try to rid themselves of the bipolarity of self (good) and other (bad) images and therefore find suitable external "targets" for these bipolar images. The positive and negative unintegrated aspects of the self are externalized on the smells, tastes, foods, and traditions at home, which become a sense of ethnicity and nationality. Those things which are invested with positive, loving feelings will support the cohesive sense of self, i.e. self identity. Those things which are invested with aggression will threaten the self identity. The individual, it is proposed, becomes part of the "pseudospecies" (Erikson 1966; 1985). He or she develops a false sense of unique identity in groups. The self concept and the concept of suitable targets become intertwined.

Hesse and Poklemba (1987) explored the development of enemy images in children through extensive interviews and

drawings. Their research supported Allport's (1958) in this
area; children go through a stage of "pregeneralized
learning" in which they try to please their parents and take
on their views. This occurs around the age of six. The
children are aware of group differences but are confused.
They learn linguistic tags to differentiate before they can
apply adult categories. Between the ages of six and ten
children's images begin to mirror the biases of their
parents and society. The authors conclude:

> There is reason to believe that the more diverse
> the conceptions a nation has of itself and other
> nations, the harder it is for children to form
> one-dimension images of themselves as good and
> the enemy as bad. (p. 11)

They also wonder why some individuals never move beyond the
view of five-year-old children--that is why do they not
develop more complex images of themselves and others which
integrate the good and bad aspects of both groups.

Several authors provide ideas about why people do not
move beyond we/they thinking and remain ethnocentric. These
theories fall into four categories, 1) the need to maintain
a sense of self (Smith, 1987; Volkan, 1985), 2) the need to
transcend the self (Kelman, 1986), 3) the need to combat
inferiority or feel superior (Erikson, 1985; White, 1984)
and 4) the need for self-protection (Kelman, 1986; Volkan,
1985). They will not be discussed in detail here.

A different approach to ethnocentrism is also
represented in the literature. In a publication authored by

the organization Beyond War, Beyond War: A New Way of Thinking, this hopeful view is presented. They believe we can move beyond our limited experience and limited identifications, and diversity can be a source of creative solution rather than a cause of war. Bagley and Verma (1979), as a result of their review of the literature regarding racial prejudice, conclude

> there is no natural tendency towards ethno-
> centrism in human beings...in some structural
> or psychological conditions, in-group
> identification is relatively weak, and the
> values and life styles of 'strangers' are
> readily accepted and absorbed; even when
> in-group identification is strong, the
> attitude to out-groups is not necessarily
> one of hostility. (p. 115)

All of these theories propose that emotional needs of human beings underly the tendency to move beyond differentiation among groups and misperception of people and their actions, to make value judgments about people based solely on their group membership, and to perceive people who are different as bad or dangerous.

The tendency to categorize people, discussed previously, is necessary to the devaluing of groups of people. In other words, if people are not separated into groups, they cannot be devalued based on their group membership alone. Therefore, this discussion of the tendency to devalue groups who are perceived as different assumes the tendency to categorize exists also. However, it is the affective expressions of we/they relationships (the

tendency to devalue and perceive as dangerous) which appear to underly the use of violence against groups. As Apostle et al. (1983) concluded following their review of the literature, the way people respond to an out-group is less dependent on perceived differences than on how those differences are explained. It is when explanations of differences include evaluative judgments that prejudice arises.

Allport (1958) asserts that "love-prejudice" must exist in order for "hate-prejudice" to exist. "One must first overestimate the thing one loves before one can underestimate their contraries" (p. 25). In other words, one must value one's own group more than the out-group.

This tendency to apply differing values to human beings appears to be strongly related to the hierarchical patriarchal social system in which we live. This system inherently places different values on different people based on their group membership, and therefore provides support and validation for the human tendency to do so (Criss & Johnson, 1989; Eisler, 1985; Reardon, 1985; Roberts, 1984; Schaef, 1981; Spretnak, 1983).

Schaef (1981) relates patriarchy to the devaluing of people or ideas which are seen as different. She points out that there is an accepted myth that the present system, the "White Male System," is the only system which exists. She goes on to state,

> Once someone is sure that the way in which he
> (or she) sees the world is the way things are,
> then he (or she) perceives any differences of
> opinion as threatening. This results in a
> closed system and a rigid approach to life in
> which all differences must be discounted,
> disparaged, or destroyed. (pp. 8-9)

In addition, Schaef points out that when one clings to the myth of innate superiority, "...one must constantly overlook the virtues and abilities of others" (p. 11). Therefore, those who are different are of less value. Several other authors recognize the tendency of humans to devalue the out-group (Hermann, 1987; Staub, 1988), and others focus on the resulting dislike and hatred of the out-group (Keen, 1986; Mack, 1988; White, 1984).

White (1984) focuses on Soviet-American relations in his discussion of one type of misperception, the "good-guys-bad-guys picture" consisting of a diabolical enemy image and moral self-image. He states that "macho pride," which he defines as "undue satisfaction from, or an undue craving for, an image of oneself or one's own group as powerful, prestigious, tough, and courageous" (p. 116) leads to various behaviors including violent acts. Thus White directly relates the tendency to overvalue one's own group to violence against the out-group. Therefore, the same processes which are at work within a country (sexism, racism) also seem to be at work between countries.

Keen (1986) points out that the use of propaganda to instill hatred leads to devaluation of the out-group by

creating an image of the other which is dehumanized. Keen proposes a "scale of dehumanization" of the enemy or out-group, and defines various types of dehumanization such as the enemy as barbarian, the greedy enemy, and the enemy as criminal. He states the final insult, the complete dehumanization of the other, is the enemy as abstraction. Keen borrows a quote from Colonel Anthony Herbert to illustrate this dehumanization in the context of war,

> If anything has happened to our country as a the result of the Vietnam War, it is our national infection with the sickness of the numbers game. We reduced the blood and suffering and the death and destruction to mere ciphers, and in so doing we reduced our own souls. Numbers don't die; people do. Columns of figures don't disintegrate in the explosion of a bomb; human beings do. Statistics don't bleed, and if you can make your war a war of numbers, you have no trouble sleeping. Most generals and presidents sleep well. (p. 84)

The tendency to dehumanize the out-group is a form of devaluing which is also discussed by Chilstrom (1984), Janis (1972), Moyer (1985), and Wessels (1986).

Hamilton and Bishop (1976) demonstrated another form of devaluing the out-group, i.e. depersonalization. They completed a series of interviews with white residents in an integrated housing project. The white residents consistently referred to black families in terms of their racial category; however, they knew and used the names of white families within the same housing project when referring to them.

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Hesse and Poklemba (1987), in their extensive interviews with 4-year-old to 6-year-old American and West German children, found that boys report feeling angry when thinking about enemies, where as girls feel sad or afraid. This distinction between hatred or anger towards the out-group and fear of the out-group may be related, respectively, to the tendency to devalue the out-group, and the tendency to perceive the out-group as dangerous. As Allport (1958) points out,

> The familiar is preferred. What is alien is
> regarded as somehow inferior, less 'good', but
> there is not necessarily hostility against it.
> (p. 40)

In other words, the tendency to devalue the out-group, "they," does not require the out-group also be seen as threatening and violent. However, perceiving the outgroup as threatening, as Keen (1986) points out, almost always requires the out-group be devalued also. There are rare instances in which the "other" is seen as a worthy and respectable opponent (i.e., chivalry between knights in medieval times). The relationship between the devaluing of groups of people to the acceptance of violence against those groups will be discussed below.

The tendency to perceive groups who are different as threatening is the final component of we/they relationships according to the model I have proposed. The tendencies to first categorize people, then to define them as less

valuable, appear to be necessary precursors to the tendency to perceive people who are different as threatening. In addition, patriarchal social systems also appear to contribute to the perception of threat. As Allport (1958) notes, within a hierarchical system members often feel their status is not secure, that "others" threaten their position in the system. The result is fear. In fact, White (1984) states fear is a word for wanting security and not having it. Although group relations do not have to be based on fear, they often are. Several authors consider fear a central feature, a major motivation in intergroup relations (Janis, 1972; Keen, 1986; Mack, 1988; McClosky, 1967; Wessels, 1986; White, 1984) which results in tension, a cyclical process which includes fear and anger (White, 1984).

The cyclical process of misperception, which leads to fear, which then leads to increased misperception, and so on, is also discussed frequently in the literature. White (1984) points out that a sense of inferiority often leads to delusions of persecution (exaggerated fear). Several authors also note that as fear or perceived threat increases, the possibility for cognitive errors, and particularly we/they distinctions based on misperceptions also increase (Deutsch, 1973; Frank, 1983; Hermann, 1987; Janis & Mann, 1977; Rosenblatt, 1964; Schwartz, 1972). It appears that the cognitive and affective components interact

producing a cycle in which misperceptions fuel anger and anxiety, which in turn fuel misperceptions. Therefore, our hearts and our heads, our feelings and thoughts, are important to the quality of intergroup relations.

Various defensive mechanisms are proposed to support and maintain the affective expression of we/they relationships. White (1984) states rationalization, projection of blame, compensation for inferiority and reaction formation are the unconscious motivators of misperceptions. Keen (1986) adds paranoia and propaganda as processes which support the affective components of we/they relationships. These processes will not be discussed in detail, however, as they are not the focus of this dissertation.

This section has reviewed the literature on the affective expression of we/they relationships, 1) the tendency to devalue people seen as different, and 2) the tendency to perceive those who are different as a threat to oneself or one's group. I propose that these two components of we/they relationships are related to the acceptance of planned violence against groups, including war.

Behavioral Expression of We/They Relationships: Violence. In the previous sections I have built a model of we/they relationships which contains three components. These components, 1) the tendency to separate people into groups, some of which are seen as different, 2) the tendency

to devalue those groups seen as different, and 3) the tendency to perceive those who are different as dangerous are the cognitive and affective components of the model of we/they relationships presented here.

The third component of attitudes which has been proposed is the behavioral component (Abelson, 1988; Apostle et al., 1983; Tajfel, 1982). This behavioral component is of particular importance because when people act on we/they attitudes the results are often, but not always, destructive. It seems likely that those who accept violence against groups, or act violently against them, will express the three components of we/they relationships I have proposed. However, this study cannot provide information regarding whether the violence or the we/they attitudes come first. A direction of causality cannot be asserted, only that these factors are related.

Several authors do propose a relationship between the cognitive and affective components of we/they relationships and behaviors (e.g., Allport, 1958; Keen, 1986; Kelman, 1986; Milbrath, 1988). Kelman stresses that there are positive and negative aspects which appear to be the result of we/they relationships. He points out that our tendency to identify with a group, to the exclusion of others, is a combination of selflessness and self-interest.

Tajfel (1981) also concluded that at least three functions of we/they relationships can be distinguished.

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They are 1) the justification of behaviors planned or committed against the out-group, 2) blaming the out-group for various distressing events such as inflation, unemployment, and defeat in war, and 3) a positive differentiation of the in-group from relevant out-groups.

Most authors do focus primarily on the negative aspects, however. For example, Milbrath (1988) points out that the dominant social paradigm results in "symptoms," which include compassion only for those who are near and dear, and exploitation of and lack of concern for others including other generations. Allport (1958) delineated five levels of acting out prejudice, 1) antilocation-talking about prejudice, 2) avoidance-avoiding members of the disliked group, 3) discrimination-excluding members of disliked group, 4) physical attack-acting violently or semi-violently against the disliked group and 5) extermination, which needs no explanation.

McClosky's (1967) findings, which were reviewed previously, provide empirical support for the negative behavior related to we/they relationships. He found that the tendency to make we/they distinctions is strongly and positively correlated with the "need to reject, avoid, or contain others" when measured by extensive attitudinal questionnaires.

In this section I will discuss negative behavioral expressions of we/they relationships. The positive aspects

of the behavioral expression of we/they relationships (Allport, 1958; Janis, 1972; Stein, 1976) will not be discussed as they are not a focus of this dissertation. However, it is important to note that it appears the positive aspects of we/they relationships, the tendencies to like one's own group and experience group cohesion, do not require dislike of the out-group. As discussed above, Johnson and Friedman (1989) found no significant correlation between love of one's own group and dislike of the out-group. It appears we do not have to sacrifice the experience of connection with others in order to eliminate violence against other groups.

Acceptance of Violence. In this section violence will be separated into two forms 1) indirect violence, such as discrimination, inequality and injustice which cause harm in a less obvious way and 2) direct violence such as physical attacks and war. The major hypothesis is that the three components of we/they relationships discussed previously, 1) the tendency to separate people into groups and define some of the groups as different, 2) the tendency to devalue those groups defined as different and 3) the tendency to perceive groups who are believed to be different as also threatening, are strongly related to the acceptance of indirect and direct violence against those groups. The previous work regarding indirect and direct violence will be reviewed in this section.

Rosenthal and Johnson (1988) found that acceptance of structural violence, which they defined largely as inequality and government oppression, was strongly and significantly correlated with acceptance of one form of direct violence, war. This result was obtained from attitudinal questionnaires completed by an adult sample of the Southern California area. The structural violence measure included some items which may actually measure we/they attitudes and therefore the results may partially support the hypotheses of this dissertation. It does appear that the tendency to accept indirect violence is highly related to the tendency to accept direct violence. Further research in this area is indicated.

Indirect Violence. Reardon (1985) states the most significant manifestation of indirect violence, or structural violence, is systematic oppression based on human differences. Differences may be in sex, race, class, culture, age or politics. She also states the oppressed often internalize the image projected by the oppressor in order to survive in the system (also see Allport, 1958).

Allport (1958) focuses on discrimination, the denial to individuals or groups of people the equality of treatment which they may wish. He emphasizes that discrimination is not the same as differential treatment of individuals when that differential treatment is based on their individual qualities. In other words, discriminatory behavior is based

on group membership alone.

Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman and Pierson (1981) concluded that whether or not we believe a group should be outlawed, or whether a group member should be allowed to give a speech, depends primarily on whether or not we like the group itself. In other words, we are more tolerant of and allow more freedoms for groups we like. It appears that limiting others' freedom is related to we/they attitudes.

The study reviewed previously by Tajfel and his colleagues (1971) demonstrated a willingness to distribute resources, which were by design limited in this experiment, unequally based solely on group membership. Those who were of the same group as the subject were consistently given more money when the subject was asked to allocate money between a member of the in-group and a member of the out-group.

The Johnson and Friedman (1989) study found that structural violence, defined as inequality and government oppression, is strongly related to dislike of the out-group, and in fact creates a cohesive factor along with acceptance of war, devaluing the environment, and valuing autonomy. The authors labeled this factor "war system." It appears that acceptance of war and structural violence, as well as dislike of the out-group, are all based on the same value system.

I have reviewed theoretical arguments and empirical

evidence which suggest a relationship between we/they relationships and acceptance of indirect violence against groups of people. In addition, it appears acceptance of indirect and direct violence against groups are also related. I will now review the literature on the acceptance of direct violence.

<u>Direct Violence Including War</u>. According to Silverstein (1986) the tendency to mischaracterize an adversary as an inhumane enemy is dangerous in that it inhibits peaceful and rational solutions of adversarial differences. Negotiation is out. Safety lies only in the destruction of the adversary.

Sumner (1906), the first to write about ethnocentrism, said this about the link between we/they relationships and acceptance of violence,

> The insiders in a we-group are in relation of
> peace, order, law, government and industry, to
> each other. Their relation to all outsiders,
> or other-groups, is one of war and plunder...
> Sentiments are produced to correspond. Loyalty
> to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and
> contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within,
> warlikeness without-all grow together, common
> products of the same situation. (p. 12)

The relationship between we/they attitudes and violence is clearly not a new idea. In fact, in 1906, Sumner proposed that violence of direct forms is perceived as justifiable because the out-group is seen as so evil as to require such drastic actions. Smith (1987) states self-righteousness and dehumanization of the other have been used

to excuse the worst atrocities throughout history. Erikson (1985) notes throughout history there appears to be a periodic and often reciprocal obsession that the others must be annihilated or "kept in their place." Keen (1986) also emphasizes that images of the other, the assumption that what is unknown is dangerous and intends us evil, is used to justify killing outsiders and to rationalize warfare. Enemy images provide sanction for the use of brutal tactics.

Beyond War (1985), in their staff-authored pamphlet, draw the connection specifically between we/they relationships and acceptance of war. They state

> Thinking war is acceptable results from a
> narrow identification and from seeing anything
> outside that limited identification as a
> potential enemy-a focus for our fear and hate.
> When something goes wrong we blame our perceived
> enemy, taking away our own power to make things
> better. This mode of thinking sanctions, at
> times even encourages, killing "the enemy." (p. 14)

White (1984) takes this further, specifying specific activities which are accepted due to these distinctions between the in-group and out-group. These activities are 1) empire-building, 2) empire-keeping, 3) territory-regaining, 4) protege-protecting, and 5) humiliation avoiding, all of which contribute to war.

The Johnson and Friedman (1989) study also provides empirical support for this link between dislike of an out-group and acceptance of war, in particular. In summary, these authors provide theoretical and empirical support for

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the hypothesis that we/they relationships are related to acceptance of direct violence against groups and war. However, further empirical evidence is clearly needed.

The attitude that violence is acceptable is quite different qualitatively than actually acting violently. Allport (1958) points out that people often threaten to act out prejudice but do not do so. Actual violent behaviors are difficult to study empirically and will not be a focus of this dissertation. However, examples are valuable to understanding we/they relationships and their link to planned violence.

Willingness to act violently. According to Hesse and Poklemba (1987) images of allies and enemies not only fuel the arms race of the superpowers, and the war between Iran and Iraq, but also Apartheid in South Africa and international terrorism. Hermann (1987) states we create images in such a way that we are released from moral inhibitions and respond to a perceived threat without constraint.

Several authors comment on the discrepancy in perceived motivations for actions which accompany we/they relationships. When "they" act violently they are committing torture, atrocity and murder because they are sadists who enjoy murdering. But when we act violently we are using surgical or strategic violence only because we are forced to by our enemy (Greening, 1986; Keen, 1986; Mack,

1988). These authors propose that violent acts are interpreted differently based on the we/they dichotomization.

There have been several empirical studies which evaluate the willingness to act violently toward specific groups. This research usually focuses on more indirect violence such as discrimination (see Murray, 1983 for a review).

In a personal conversation with Tilden (1988), the Vietnam veteran commented on how it became more difficult to kill at some point during the war, rather than less difficult. He related this change to the Civil Rights Movement which was taking place among the troops in Vietnam. If it was no longer acceptable to discriminate against people of color because they were human beings too, how could it be acceptable to kill Vietnamese just because they had different values? This is one man's story, and therefore making any generalizations would be irresponsible. For this man, however, the breakdown of in-group/out-group distinctions clearly made the use of violence less acceptable.

In this section I have reviewed the literature regarding we/they relationships. I divided we/they relationships into three proposed components, 1) the tendency to separate people into groups, some of which are perceived as different, 2) the tendency to devalue groups

perceived as different, and 3) the tendency to perceive the groups who are different as dangerous to one's self. The relationship of these cognitive and affective components of we/they relationships to behavioral expressions, with a focus on acceptance of violence and war, in particular, was then explored. There are many forms of we/they relationships which could be considered (ie. we/they relationships based on sex, sexual preference, occupation, educational level and religion). In the following section I will briefly discuss two forms of we/they relationships which will be evaluated in this dissertation.

Summary of Two Specific Forms of We/They Relationships.

Much of the theory of prejudice, discrimination and attitude formation has been created through examinations of racism. More recently nationalism has also been a focus. In this section I will briefly review literature regarding racism and nationalism as it relates directly to the model of we/they relationships proposed. This is primarily a review of the literature discussed previously, but will be discussed here as it applies specifically to these two forms of we/they relationships.

Racism. Blauner (1972) defines racism as the tendency to "categorize people who are culturally different in terms of noncultural traits" (p. 17) such as skin color, hair and structure of the face and eyes (difference). Jones (1987) emphasizes that it is the devaluation of what is perceived

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as different which is central to racism (less valuable). Sherwood (1980) defines racism as the misuse of racial groups (violence). Allport (1958) and Apostle et al. (1983) include three aspects in their definitions of racism. Racism is cognitive (the harboring of negative beliefs about an out-group), affective (having negative feelings about the out-group), and conative (willingness to engage in—I would add the acceptance of—discriminatory behavior toward the out-group). Therefore, these authors have discussed the various components of we/they relationships in the specific context of racism.

Allport (1958) distinguishes forms of violence against people of different races. These include discrimination (indirect violence), and riots and lynching (direct violence).

Several authors have completed empirical studies regarding racism (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1958; Apostle et al., 1983; Blauner, 1978; also see Cauthen, 1971; Murray, 1983 for reviews). These studies have found that racism has an impact on attitudes and behavior inside and outside the laboratory. Although these studies were not designed to evaluate the link between we/they attitudes and the acceptance of violence, they provide preliminary support for the hypotheses of this dissertation.

Nationalism. Volkan (1985) defines nationalism as 1) the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified

like insects (different) and then labeled good or bad (less valuable), and 2) the identification with one nation or unit along with the tendency to place it beyond judgement, recognizing no duty other than advancing its interests. Kelman (1986) emphasizes that the definition of a national group is a marking off process by which some are included and others excluded. According to Feshbach (1987) nationalism is "among the noblest and the most destructive of human impulses" (p. 320). It is the competitive feature between nations, the desire for one's country to be dominant, and one's countrymen superior (Feshbach & Singer, 1985). Peck (1987) relates nationalism to group processes and states it appears to be a natural stage in intergroup relations, but one that can be transcended; we can move beyond this competitive stance.

Nationalism should be differentiated from the concept of patriotism which has been defined as the love of one's country (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1987). These authors gave an attitudinal measure of patriotism/nationalism to three different populations (college students, high school students, and building contractors). They found that nationalistic attitudes correlate positively and significantly with acceptance of war. However, patriotism is not related significantly to acceptance of war. This finding appears to be analogous to Johnson and Friedman's (1989) results, that love of one's own group does not

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significantly correlate with acceptance of war while dislike of the outgroup does significantly and positively correlate with the acceptance of war.

Nationalism has been defined in the literature in such a way that it includes the three components of we/they relationships I have proposed, 1) the tendency to perceive people as separate and different, 2) the tendency to devalue groups perceived as different, and 3) the tendency to perceive groups who are different as a threat. We/they relationships in international relations have been given a specific name in the literature--enemy images. Recognition of the existence and importance of enemy images has increased in recent years. The term has in fact become a part of "every day" language. For example, an unidentified Soviet newscaster used the phrase "enemy images" on ABC's Nightline recently (ABC Television, 1987). The amount of recent work in this area reflects this interest. Several authors emphasize the polarization of images, of "we" (good) and "they" (bad), in enemy images (Erikson, 1988; Holt, 1987; Keen, 1986; Mack, 1988; Wahlstrom, 1987; White, 1984).

The relationship of enemy images to violence has been discussed frequently in the literature. Silverstein (1986) states that when enemy images exist security lies only in destruction of the enemy. The build up of arms is perceived as a form of security against the "threat" of the enemy (Hesse & Poklemba, 1987; Peck, 1987; Saunders, 1988;

Silverstein, 1988; White, 1984). Direct violence in international relations is expressed through terrorism (Hesse & Poklemba, 1987) and war (Allport, 1958; Buie, 1987; Hesse & Poklemba, 1987; Mack, 1988; White, 1984). In fact, when enemy images become extreme it is perceived as immoral not to kill (Hermann, 1987). As a result the survival of the entire planet is at risk (Mack, 1985), as our security systems threaten our own safety.

The increase in empirical studies of nationalism and enemy images is represented by research such as Feshbach (1987), Hesse and Poklemba (1987, 1988), Holt (1987), Silverstein (1988), and Winter (1987). These studies substantiate the concept of nationalism. They will not be reviewed in detail here as their focus is not directly relevant to the hypotheses of this study, and the proposed model in particular (see Silverstein, 1989 for a thorough review).

In this section I have briefly reviewed the literature regarding two specific forms of we/they relationships: racism and nationalism. I have shown that the theoretical and empirical literature supports my proposed model of we/they relationships and the link between these relationships and acceptance of planned violence (Brewer, 1978; Holt, 1987; Johnson & Friedman, 1989; McClosky, 1967; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969; Rosenthal & Johnson, 1989; Tajfel, 1981; also see thorough reviews by Cauthen, 1971; Levine &

Campbell, 1972).

Smith (1987) concludes that in the last 50 years the world has become even more divided, nations more polarized, and bitter ethnic and religious conflicts rage. The need for a clear understanding of the factors which contribute to these destructive tendencies is more important than ever. We cannot create peace if we are unsure of the factors which are contributing to the violence. I propose that one factor, the factor which is the focus of this study, is we/they relationships.

Statement of the Problem.

The purpose of this dissertation is to propose a model of we/they relationships which is based on the theoretical and empirical literature in this area and to evaluate the link between we/they relationships and the acceptance of planned violence against groups. Previous research has established a link between cognitive and affective expressions of we/they attitudes and the acceptance of planned violence against groups (i.e. behavioral expressions) in various settings. However, the relationship of the specific components of we/they attitudes to acceptance of violence has not been evaluated. In addition, this model has not been evaluated in a parallel manner across different forms of we/they relationships, specifically racism and nationalism (which is limited here to perceptions of the Soviets). This study is expected to

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provide information regarding the factors which may contribute to violence against groups of people. In addition, the results should support or refute the need for broad definitions of peace which include violence against all groups of people (rather than the absence of war) in that it will provide useful information regarding whether or not the two forms of we/they relationships are both linked to the acceptance of violence. The specific terms have been defined conceptually throughout this chapter and will be defined operationally in the next chapter.

Hypotheses

1. Components of We/They Relationships

   a. The construct of we/they relationships has three components, a) the tendency to separate people into groups, some of which are perceived as different from one's own group, b) the tendency to perceive those groups defined as different as bad or less valuable, and c) the tendency to perceive those groups defined as different as dangerous or threatening.

   b. These components build on one another, the first (difference) is required in order for the second (less valuable) to exist, and both the first and second must exist in order for the third (dangerous) to occur.

c. The degree of racism, attitudes toward the Soviets and general in-group/out-group attitudes will be positively correlated.

2. We/They Relationships and Violence

   a. Endorsement of we/they relationships will be positively correlated with the acceptance of planned violence against the out-group. The relationship between the components of we/they attitudes and acceptance of planned violence will be stronger as the magnitude of the components of we/they relationships increases. (See Figure 1).

   b. The tendency to devalue those in other groups (component 2) and the tendency to perceive others as threatening (component 3) will relate more strongly to acceptance of planned violence than will the tendency to perceive others as different from one's own group (component 1) (Figure 1).

   c. Indirect violence will be more strongly related to racism in particular, and in-group/out-group perceptions in general, than it is to attitudes toward the Soviets.

   d. Acceptance of war will be more strongly related to a specific form of we/they relationship--attitudes toward the Soviets--

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Components of We/They Relationships

3 Components	Perceive those who are different as dangerous	HIGHER
	⬆	⬆
2 Components	Devalue those perceived as different	Acceptance of violence against the out-group
	⬆	
1 Component	Define others as separate and different	LOWER

Figure 1. The Proposed Relationship of the Components of We/They Relationships to Acceptance of Violence Against the Out-Group

than to racism or general in-group/out-group
attitudes.

CHAPTER III

METHODS

In this section I will specify the methods used to
evaluate the link between we/they relationships and the
acceptance of planned violence. Specifically, I will
discuss the participants, the procedure, human subjects
issues, instrumentation, and data analysis which are
pertinent to this dissertation.

Participants. The participants in this study were
adults from Los Angeles and Orange counties. They were
recruited through acquaintance networks, and contacts at
such settings as corporate offices and the canvassing of
settings such as shopping malls, beaches, and laundromats.
Areas which were targeted include urban Los Angeles, Santa
Monica, Venice, Pacoima, Pasadena/Glendale, Costa Mesa and
Newport Beach. An effort was made to obtain a sample which
is representative of the Southern California area on the
following factors: political party affiliation, gender,
socioeconomic status, and ethnic group. The subjects were
compared on these factors to recent demographic statistics

for Los Angeles and Orange counties (Metro Insights, 1988).
The results of this comparison will be reported in the next
chapter. In addition, recruits were selected from settings
which were likely to produce a range of liberal and
conservative subjects. Subjects which approximate a
representative sample of two large urban and suburban
counties were chosen to maximize generalizability of results
within practical limits. A total of 155 questionnaires were
returned. Six were discarded due to excessive amounts of
missing data (three or more questions left unanswered).

Procedures. Each subject was asked to complete a
questionnaire which contained 22 items to assess demographic
variables and 97 items which assessed attitudes. The
questionnaire took an estimated 30 minutes to complete.

Prior to administration of the questionnaire, which was
identified only by a code number, the subjects were asked to
complete an informed consent form (see Appendix A). This
always occurred in person. Questionnaires and signed
consent forms were kept separately at all times.

Instruments. A 22 item demographic background survey
was given, along with a 97 item attitude measure. (See
Appendix B for a copy of the questionnaire). The
attitudinal measure was rated on a 7-point Likert scale from
strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (7).

The scales included 1) race-different, 2) race-less
valuable, 3) race-dangerous, 4) Soviet-different, 5) Soviet-

less valuable, 6) Soviet-dangerous, 7) in-group/out-group different, 8) in-group/out-group less valuable, 9) in-group/out-group dangerous, 10) indirect violence, 11) direct violence, and 12) war. (See Appendix C for lists of items organized by scales).

Each scale was additive. A low score on each scale indicated a high ranking on that variable. Scale scores were divided by the number of items in the scale. Therefore a score of 1 was the highest possible score on each scale, and a score of 7 was the lowest possible score on each scale. For example, a score of 1 on the "acceptance of indirect violence" scale indicated a high acceptance of indirect violence. All scales contained items which were worded in the reverse of the concept (e.g., not dangerous) and therefore the item scores on these particular items were reversed.

Scales Regarding We/They Relationships.

The constructs of different, less valuable and dangerous were consistently defined across the three groups (race, Soviets and in-group/out-group). An effort was made to include similar items across the three groups (parallel construction).

Race-measured attitudes regarding racial, ethnic, and cultural groups.

Soviet-measured attitudes regarding people from the Soviet Union.

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In-group/Out-group-measured attitudes regarding people
with whom the subject identified as his or her own group in
comparison to attitudes regarding people that the subject
perceived as belonging to an "other" group (how the subject
perceived "us" vs. "them").

We/They-included all items from the race, Soviet and
in-group/out-group scales.

Different-endorsed the view that people of various
groups are different or separate from one's own group.
These items purposefully excluded any references to value
judgments regarding groups, or actions toward groups.

Examples:

Race

> There are many differences, besides color,
> between me and people from other
> ethnic groups.

Soviet

> The Soviet people are fundamentally different
> from us.

In-group/Out-group

> All people are the same. (R)

All Different-included all different scale items from
the race, Soviet and in-group/out-group scales.

Less Valuable-endorsed the view that people of various
groups are bad, liked less, worth less or contribute less
than people of one's own group. Items which refer to
differences, or perceived danger were excluded, as were

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items which involved behavioral components.

Examples:

Race

I value people of my same ethnic group more
than others.

Soviets

The Soviets are likeable. (R)

In-group/Out-group

I tend to like people who are most like me. (R)

All Less Valuable-included all less valuable items from
the race, Soviet and in-group/out-group scales.

Dangerous-endorsed the view that people of various
groups pose a threat to oneself or one's own group, and that
they should be feared. Questions refer to perceived danger,
threat or untrustworthy qualities. The questions excluded
references to behaviors, and in particular acts of violence
which would have confounded interpretation of the dangerous
scales and the violence scales.

Examples:

Race

People of ethnic groups other than mine
tend to be more threatening.

Soviets

The Soviets pose no direct threat to us. (R)

In-group/Out-group

I feel safe with people from many different
backgrounds. (R)

All Dangerous-included all dangerous items from the race, Soviets and in-group/out-group scales.

Scales Regarding Violence

The constructs which relate to violence are as follows:

Indirect Violence-the acceptance of acts which are planned and are harmful to others, yet are not readily apparent, such as oppression, injustice, inequality and poverty. Acts of violence which are direct and cause immediate physical harm were excluded from this scale as were references to specific groups of people. This scale is based heavily on the structural violence scale developed by Johnson and Friedman (1989) and another set of data (Johnson, 1989). Items were changed to removed references to particular groups of people.

Examples:

> Sometimes people take equality too far.
>
> There will always be people in poverty.

Direct Violence-the acceptance of acts which are planned and are physically harmful to others, such as bodily attacks. Crimes of passion were excluded from this scale, as were acts which are typically specific to a particular group such as rape or spousal abuse.

Examples:

> There are times when the only way to resolve
> conflict is to plan to injure the opposition.

There are circumstances in which a person has a right to plan to harm someone.

War-the acceptance of war of any type. References to specific groups are excluded from this scale.

Examples:

There are situations in which we have no choice but to go to war.

War is unacceptable. (R)

All Violence-included all items from the indirect violence, direct violence and war scales.

Although it would have been preferable to use scales which were standardized, there were two problems which precluded the use of previously developed measures in this study. Most importantly, the model which is central to this study could not be evaluated with measures used previously. For example, Adorno et al (1950) developed a scale which measures attitudes toward blacks and minorities in general, as well as patriotism. A total of 14 items were used. However, the items are no longer appropriate in that they refer to language and incidents which occurred forty years ago, and the items include references to violence against specific groups which would have confounded the data analysis regarding the relationship between we/they attitudes and acceptance of violence in this dissertation. Fey (1955) and McClosky (1967), developed measures which are similar to the in-group/out-group measures, but would also

have confounded this study in that they include aspects such as the use of violence against specific groups in their measures. Allport (1958), Apostle et al. (1983), and Blauner (1978) also completed empirical studies of racism. Their scales were not developed in such a way as to evaluate the model presented here. Therefore, these previously used scales could not have provided a clean evaluation of the link between we/they relationships and the acceptance of planned violence, and the development of a new measure was necessary. However, some items in this new scale were similar to those in previous scales, but were worded so that the concepts of different, less valuable, dangerous, and the acceptance of planned violence were always separate.

Similar problems arose with scales regarding nationalism (Christiansen, 1959; Ferguson, 1947; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1987), attitudes toward war (Day & Quackenbush, 1941; Johnson, 1987; Putney, 1967), and structural violence (Rosenthal & Johnson, 1989). These scales measure areas related to this study; however, the scales contain items which assess violence against specific groups. The concepts of we/they relationships and the acceptance of violence were not separated, as was essential in this study. Therefore, these scales could not be appropriately used to evaluate the link between we/they relationships and the acceptance of violence. There were no standardized scales which evaluate we/they attitudes based on the model of cognitive and

affective components and the relationship of these components, individually and in combination, to the acceptance of planned violence.

In addition, the length of the measure developed here (97 items), which was necessary in order to evaluate the number of constructs to be studied, precluded the use of other measures in addition to the newly developed scales. Although a comparison between the newly developed measure and those used previously would have been helpful in order to evaluate the criterion-related validity of the newly developed scale, the additional length of the questionnaire would likely have reduced the response rate for subjects. The costs outweighed the benefits in this case.

The scales were determined to have face validity based on the assessment of the author and three independent raters. These raters were professionals in areas other than clinical psychology. They were provided detailed definitions of the constructs which are represented in each scale. The raters were asked to place each item in the category which it best represented. Items which were not categorized the same by all three raters were discarded. The scales were based on the theoretical and empirical research reviewed in the previous chapter.

A very limited pilot study (n=5) was also completed in order to assess whether a reasonable variability of responses would occur for each question. Subjects were

three men and two women who ranged in age from 26-years-old to 57-years-old. They were highly educated (3 of 5 completed 4 years of college or more), middle class and primarily white. The sample was primarily "somewhat liberal". The limited preliminary analysis of data obtained from these subjects indicates that most questions elicited varied responses from subjects and will therefore provide data which can be analyzed effectively. Those items which prompted fairly consistent responses were either eliminated or reworded.

Therefore, as these scales were newly developed Cronbach's α and inter-item correlations of reliability were completed. In addition, each item was correlated with each scale resulting in an item-scale matrix in order to assess whether each item correlated most strongly with its proposed scale. The scales were formed based on this empirical analysis and were combined for certain analyses (i.e., the all different, all less valuable and all dangerous scales). In other words, the reliability on these combined scales was good and they were collapsed across corresponding constructs for some of the analyses.

Data Analysis. The independent variables in this study were the three components of we/they relationships: 1) different, 2) less valuable, and 3) dangerous. The dependent variables were the constructs of acceptance of various forms of violence: 1) indirect violence, 2) direct

violence, and 3) war. The hypotheses are operationalized below.

Initially, frequencies were run on the various demographic variables. Hypotheses 1a was evaluated with a factor analysis. A series of multiple regressions, a path analysis, was completed to explore the proposed model of we/they relationships which corresponds to Hypothesis 1b.

Correlations were used to evaluate the remaining hypotheses. Correlation matrices were used which include 1) the three proposed components of we/they relationships (different, less valuable, and dangerous) and the acceptance of planned violence (indirect violence, direct violence and war), and 2) the correlations between the specific forms of we/they relationships (racism, attitudes toward the Soviets and in-group/out-group) and the various forms of planned violence (indirect violence, direct violence and war). (See Table 1) These matrices correspond to Hypotheses 1c, 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d.

Operationalized Hypotheses.

1.a. It was proposed that we/they relationships (race different, race less valuable, race dangerous, Soviet different, Soviet less valuable, Soviet dangerous, in-group/out-group different, in-group/out-group less valuable, and in-group/out-group dangerous) would form statistically reliable discernable groups based on

Table 1

The Correlation Matrices to be Evaluated

	indirect violence	direct violence	war
all different			
all less valuable			
all dangerous			

[To be completed 4 times: racism, nationalism, in-group/out-group, all forms]

	indirect violence	direct violence	war	all forms of violence
total racism				
total Soviet				
total in-group/ out-group				
total all forms we/they				

the three proposed components (different, less valuable and dangerous), and the three specific groups (racism, nationalism and in-group/out-group). Within each we/they measure scales would factor into different, less valuable and dangerous.

b. Given the adequate reliability, a path analysis was completed on the three conceptually developed components of we/they relationships (different, less valuable, and dangerous). It was proposed that the higher the scores on the "different" scales the higher the scores would be on the "less valuable" scales, and the higher the scores on both "different" and "less valuable" scales the higher the scores would be on "dangerous" scales. A path was proposed.

c. It was proposed that a significant correlation would be found between the measures of racism, attitudes toward the Soviets and in-group/out-group.

2.a. The scores on the acceptance of violence scales (indirect violence, direct violence and war) and the we/they attitude scales (race different, race less valuable, race dangerous, Soviet different, Soviet less valuable, Soviet dangerous, in-group/out-group different, in-group/out-group less

valuable and in-group/out-group dangerous) would strongly and significantly correlate.

b. Correlations of the "different" scales with the acceptance of planned violence scales were compared to correlations of the "less valuable" and "dangerous" scales to the acceptance of planned violence scales. It was proposed that the "different" component would be less strongly correlated with acceptance of planned violence than the "less valuable" and "dangerous" scale would be.

c. Correlations of all three scales ("different", "less valuable" and "dangerous") to the acceptance of indirect violence were compared across racism, attitudes toward the Soviets and in-group/out-group. It was proposed that racism and in-group/out-group scales would correlate more strongly with acceptance of indirect violence than would the Soviet scale.

d. A comparison of the correlations of all three scales ("different", "less valuable" and "dangerous") regarding racism, attitudes toward the Soviets and in-group/out-group to the acceptance of war scale were completed. It was hypothesized that the Soviet scales would correlate most strongly with the acceptance

of war scale.

Assumptions and Limitations. There were several assumptions made in this study. Based on the theoretical and empirical research presented in the previous chapter, it was assumed that we/they relationships exist and could be evaluated through attitudinal measures. It was also assumed that the acceptance of forms of violence could be evaluated through attitudinal measures.

This study was limited, however. The sample, although it was reasonably representative of Los Angeles and Orange Counties, was small, and from a limited geographical area. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized beyond this immediate population. Further research to replicate the findings of this study is recommended to assess the generalizability of the results.

Another possible limitation regarding the subjects is a possibility of self-selection. Acquaintance networks and canvassing were used to obtain subjects and it is possible that subjects who agreed to participate may differ from those who did not participate in some way which would interact with the variables in this study, therefore confounding the results.

As this study was correlational in nature, no conclusions can be drawn about the causal factors in we/they relationships and acceptance of violence; only the relationship of these factors to each other was explored.

As the measures which were used to evaluate these variables were newly developed, they also posed limitations. Inter-item and item/scale correlations were assessed, but the stability of these scales over time cannot be evaluated. Also, the scales have face validity, which supports the likelihood of content validity, but the construct validity and criterion-related validity could not be evaluated. Therefore, the results must be interpreted within these limitations, and further research is recommended in order to assess the validity and reliability of the scales used.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

This chapter presents the findings in the study of the relationship of perceptions of groups of people to the acceptance of planned violence against groups. First, demographic characteristics of the sample obtained will be presented. Next, reliability and validity of the measures will be discussed. Finally, hypothesized results and additional findings will be examined.

Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

Table 2 presents demographic characteristics of the sample and comparable normative data from Los Angeles and Orange counties. Of the 149 subjects 80 were male (54%) and 69 were female (46%). The mean age of the sample was 31.6 years old and ranged from 18 to 70 years of age. Therefore, the sample was somewhat younger than the population in Orange and Los Angeles Counties.

The subjects represent the ethnic diversity of Southern California. The sample was 59.5% White, 15.5% Latino, 12.8% Black, 4.7% Asian, 4.7% Native American, and 2.8% of

Table 2

Demographic Characteristics of Subjects

Category	N	Relative Frequency	Los Angeles County	Orange County
Gender				
Male	80	54.0%	49.5%	50.2%
Female	69	46.0%	50.5%	49.8%
Age (M=31.6)				
18 to 24 years	44	29.5%	17.1%	18.1%
25 to 44 years	87	58.4%	29.7%	30.9%
45 to 64 years	16	10.8%	19.5%	19.2%
65 years and older	2	1.3%	9.9%	8.3%
Ethnicity				
White	88	58.7%	68.7%	87.2%
Black	19	12.7%	12.6%	1.3%
Nonwhite/Non-Black	42	27.4%	18.7%	11.6%
Asian	7	4.7%		
Latino	23	15.3%		
Native American	7	4.7%		
Other	4	2.7%		

Table 2 (Continued)

Category	N	Relative Frequency	Los Angeles County	Orange County
Income Level				
No Income	7	4.7%	–	–
Less than $5000	9	6.0%	–	–
$5001 to $10,000	8	5.3%	–	–
$10,001 to $15,000	15	10.0%	–	–
$15,001 to $20,000	14	9.3%	–	–
$20,001 to $25,000	13	8.7%	–	–
$25,001 to $30,000	22	14.7%	–	–
$30,001 to $40,000	20	13.3%	–	–
$40,001 to $50,000	11	7.3%	–	–
$50,001 to $75,000	9	6.0%	–	–
$75,001 to $100,000	6	4.0%	–	–
$100,001 and over	9	4.7%	–	–
Mean Income for				
Adult Population	$20,000–$30,000		$25,200	$23,500
Mean Income per				
Capita	$17,710		$17,658	$21,400
Educational Level				
High School Diploma	144	96.6%	69.9%	79.8%
1 or more years of college	125	84.0%	38.5%	45.8%
Political Party				
Democrat	63	42.0%		
Republican	50	33.3%		
Independent/Other	11	7.4%		
None	21	14.0%		

respondents   were   from other ethnic backgrounds.

The   subjects   were   also   representative. of   Southern California   in   terms of mean income   for   adults   ($20,000-30,000), mean income per capita ($17,710), and the number of households   with children (32.7%).   However, the sample   was relatively highly educated with 95.7% having completed   high school and 73% attending some college.

Several   other   subject   characteristics   were   assessed although   no   data   was   available to make comparisons to the populations   of   Orange   and Los Angeles counties.   Subjects were   asked   to   indicate   all occupational situations which were applicable to them.   Some subjects marked more than one category.   Of   the sample 75.3%   were   employed   full-time, 15.3% were employed part-time, 4% worked full-time at   home, 2.7%   were   unemployed,   12% were   students   and   1.3%   were retired.

In   terms   of   marital status, 34% of the subjects were married, 40% were single, 12.7% "lived together", 11.3% were divorced or separated, and 2% were widowed.

The   sample   was 42.6% Democrat and   33.8%   Republican, while   23.6%   reported   being   Independent   or   having   no particular   party   affiliation.   However,   fewer   subjects reported voting predominantly along party lines (Democrat   = 35.4%,   Republican = 26.5%).   Subjects were asked to   report whether   they perceive themselves as politically liberal   or conservative.   The sample was 47.6% liberal (9.2% were   very

liberal, 23.8% were liberal, 14.6% were slightly liberal), 36.2% were conservative (23% were very conservative, 16.2% were conservative, 17.7% were slightly conservative) and 16.2% were neither. The subjects reported that 4% were strongly involved in politics, 20.8% were moderately involved, 40.3% were slightly involved and 34.9% were not involved.

In terms of religious affiliation 34.5% were Catholic, 31.1% were Protestant, 8.1% were Jewish, 8.2% belonged to another religion (included Buddhist and Moslem religions) and 18.2% reported no religious affiliation. A large percentage of subjects (34.9%) reported they were not involved in their religion, 27.1% were slightly involved, 22.5% were moderately involved and 15.5% were strongly involved.

The majority of subjects were born in the United States (81.2%). However, 5.4% were born in Central and South America, 4.7% in Western Europe, 3.4% in Mexico and the remainder were from Iran, the Pacific Islands and Asia (5.4%). The majority were U.S. citizens (89.9%).

Subjects were asked several questions about their experience with military service and war. Of the sample 16.7% served in the military and 3.3% fought in a war (WWII, Korea, Vietnam and Grenada). The percentage of subjects who lived in a country while a war was fought on its soil was 4.7% (Iran, El Salvador and Ireland).

Based on statistics regarding the demographic composition of Los Angeles and Orange Counties (Metro Insights, 1988) the sample appeared to be reasonably representative of these predominantly urban Southern California counties. However, the sample was slightly younger and more well-educated than these populations.

Analyses of the Measurements

Since the measurements used in this study were newly developed, several analyses were conducted to assess their reliability and validity. First, each item was correlated with each scale to determine whether the items correlated most strongly with the scale to which they were assigned. Pearson correlation coefficients were computed and are reported in Table 3 (we/they scales) and Table 4 (violence scales). As is evident, all but four items correlated most strongly with the scale to which they were originally assigned. The effect of removing these items from the scale on the scale's reliability was assessed for each of these items (60, 64, 79, 93) and was found to be negligible (less than .03). Therefore, all items were retained as originally assigned.

Reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alpha) were computed for each scale and are reported in Table 5. These coefficients range form .57 to .93, and all coefficients were considered sufficient given the sample size. In-group/out-group different (.57) and in-group/out-group

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Table 3

Correlations of Each We/They Item to Each We/They Scale (Item/Scale Matix)

Questions	Race Different	Race Less Valuable	Race Dangerous	Soviet Different	Soviet Less Valuable	Soviet Dangerous	In-Group/ Out-Group Different	In-Group/ Out-Group Less Valuable	In-Group/ Out-Group Dangerous
Q 1	#.5136***	.1430*	.2001**	.1771*	.0980	.0841	.2681***	.2221**	.2709***
Q12	#.5451***	.3206***	.2265**	.2952***	.2980***	.1815*	.3999***	.2972***	.2853***
Q40	#.6853***	.2261**	.3090***	.2801***	.1582*	.1905**	.6078***	.2431***	.2838***
Q60	#.2871***	#.4870***	.3290***	.3040***	.4345***	.2221**	.1580*	.4043***	.4121***
Q77	#.5987***	.0288	.0311	.1360*	.0419	.0371	.4330***	.1255	.0488
Q80	#.2887***	-.0054	.0435	.1004	.0209	.1412*	.2704***	-.0582	.0396
Q87	#.6387***	.3331***	.2012**	.3483***	.1917**	.1191	.4407***	.2563***	.2456***
Q92	#.5461***	.2421***	.3201***	.1275	.1583**	.2538***	.3378***	.2764***	.3182***
Q15	.2960***	#.6741***	.5203***	.2992***	.4702***	.3181***	.2185**	.5666***	.4350***
Q26	.2671***	#.6030***	.4579***	.2129**	.3197***	.2741***	.2150**	.5688***	.3399***
Q54	.1826*	#.4999***	.1898**	.3256***	.4984***	.2357**	-.0018	.3570***	.3158***
Q69	.1464*	#.5907***	.4917***	.3045***	.5033***	.3755***	.1252	.4238***	.3630***
Q72	.2319**	#.7234***	.4565***	.3580***	.5147***	.2475***	.0951	.6004***	.4315***

(table continues)

Note.

n=149 for all items

*p < .05

**p < .01

***p < .001

# indicates which scale the item is in.

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Table 3 (Continued)

Questions	Race Different	Race Less Valuable	Race Dangerous	Soviet Different	Soviet Less Valuable	Soviet Dangerous	In-Group Out-Group Different	In-Group/ Out-Group Less Valuable	In-Group Out-Group Dangerous
Q88	.4586***	#.6366	.4128***	.3394***	.3941***	.2625***	.3394***	.4812***	.4805***
Q94	.3005***	#.6479***	.4107***	.3723***	.3564***	.2835***	.1654*	.4479***	.3618***
Q97	.2840***	#.7243***	.4822***	.2614***	.3798***	.2756***	.1757*	.3930***	.4318***
Q 9	.1319	.3250***	#.5313***	.1725*	.3351***	.2689***	.0833	.2282*	.2715***
Q16	.2022**	.2182**	#.4647***	.1340	.1321	.1126	.2111**	.2388**	.3144***
Q21	.1769*	.2838***	#.6053***	.1868*	.0805	.2218**	.1488*	.3842***	.5050***
Q25	.2531***	.4299***	#.5953***	.1617*	.1810*	.1627*	.2624***	.4900***	.5102***
Q44	.3303***	.5182***	#.6480***	.3577***	.4474***	.3638***	.2674***	.5310***	.5541***
Q62	.3336***	.4627***	#.6186***	.3430***	.4009***	.4064***	.2084**	.4297***	.4417***
Q86	.2366**	.5399***	#.6434***	.2175**	.3540***	.3197***	.0312	.4319***	.4927***
Q96	.2068**	.4362***	#.5462***	.1962**	.2206**	.3082***	.1389*	.2737***	.3042***
Q 2	.1797*	.2736***	.1154	#.6831***	.4948***	.3810***	.1406*	.1729*	.2083**
Q18	.1929**	.3107***	.1493*	#.7054***	.4822***	.3153***	.1661*	.3028***	.2360*
Q29	.2121**	.2391**	.1675*	#.6598***	.2640***	.3291***	.2261**	.1876*	.1430*

(table continues)

Note.

n=149 for all items

*p < .05

**p < .01

***p < .001

# indicates which scale the item is in.

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Table 3 (Continued)

Questions	Race Different	Race Less Valuable	Race Dangerous	Soviet Different	Soviet Less Valuable	Soviet Dangerous	In-Group Out-Group Different	In-Group/ Out-Group Less Valuable	In-Group Out-Group Dangerous
Q33	.1951**	.3976***	.2653***	#.6019***	.5504***	.4472***	.1847*	.3287***	.2710***
Q51	.2540***	.3390***	.3470***	#.6493***	.3662***	.3788***	.3288***	.3124***	.2860***
Q78	.1580*	.4221***	.3765***	#.5472***	.4844***	.3503***	.1244	.3538***	.4469***
Q82	.2342**	.1147	.1816*	#.4562***	.0924	.1166	.3340***	.1220	.1125
Q93	.5598***	.2144**	.2064**	#.4813***	.2387*	.3402***	.4440**	.2488***	.2038**
Q10	.1367*	.4564***	.2703***	.3253***	#.5909***	.2834***	.0694	.3127***	.3150***
Q30	.0607	.4917***	.2906***	.3046***	#.5496***	.2306**	-.0500	.2763***	.2752***
Q38	.1490*	.4500***	.3457***	.3247***	#.6688***	.3689***	.0817	.4252***	.2518***
Q53	.1355*	.3501***	.1906**	.2706***	#.5885***	.3245***	-.0517	.1906**	.1657*
Q65	.1203	.2585***	.1682*	.4834***	#.6535***	.4957***	.0587	.1902**	.2130**
Q70	.2239**	.3088***	.2477***	.3434***	#.5610***	.5151***	.2618***	.2554***	.1785**
Q73	.4860***	.5221***	.3681***	.6023***	#.7097***	.4995***	.4408*	.4650***	.3821***
Q89	.3437***	.5231***	.4341***	.4633***	#.7760***	.4739***	.2829***	.4726***	.4031***
Q13	.1397*	.2843***	.3429***	.4219***	.4098***	#.7394***	.0950	.1980**	.3180***
Q20	.1357*	.4221***	.4416***	.4268***	.4557***	#.6363***	.1320	.3455***	.4095***

Note.

n=149 for all items

*p < .05

**p < .01

***p < .001

# Indicates which scale the item is in.

(table continues)

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Table 3 (Continued)

Questions	Race Different	Race Less Valuable	Race Dangerous	Soviet Different	Soviet Less Valuable	Soviet Dangerous	In-Group Out-Group Different	In-Group/ Out-Group Less Valuable	In-Group Out-Group Dangerous
Q31	.1683*	.4261***	.3632***	.3961***	.6303***	#.5929***	.1466*	.2535***	.2625***
Q34	.0830	.2917***	.2913***	.3627***	.4450***	#.6088***	.0803	.2059***	.1878*
Q37	.2129**	.1961**	.1302	.3270***	.3142***	#.6288***	.2065**	.1759*	.1583*
Q43	.2330**	.3583***	.3347***	.4751***	.5006***	#.7898***	.2175**	.2775***	.3324***
Q46	.2544***	.2150**	.3228***	.3089***	.3994***	#.7301***	.2816***	.2206**	.2315**
Q55	.2011**	.4376***	.4044***	.3796***	.4841***	#.6321***	.2880***	.3986***	.2939***
Q59	.2803***	.0483	.1315	.2231**	.1893**	#.6116***	.3222***	.0987	.0561
Q 8	.4197***	.1610*	.1425*	.1613*	.1287	.1203	#.4685***	.1229	.1736*
Q23	.4543***	.2599***	.2508***	.3338***	.1782*	.1741*	#.6319***	.2396**	.1369*
Q28	.1957**	.2492***	.2463***	.2885***	.2470***	.2602***	#.4381***	.2054**	.2324**
Q39	.4171***	.0958	.1712*	.2266**	.1135	.0719	#.5395***	.0749	.0827
Q61	.6044***	.1446*	.1545*	.2150**	.1052	.1072	#.6249***	.2335**	.2038**
Q74	.3121***	-.0335	.0837	.1335	-.0283	.1221	#.5215***	.1034	.1239
Q83	.0606	-.2152**	-.2014**	.0266	-.1877*	-.0310	#.2641***	-.1826*	-.1498*
Q90	.1887*	.2713***	.2090***	.2289**	.2385**	.3257***	#.4375***	.2906***	.1790*

Note.

--- n=149 for all items

*p < .05

**p < .01

***p < .001

# indicates which scale the item is in.

(table continues)

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Table 3 (Continued)

Questions	Race Different	Race Less Valuable	Race Dangerous	Soviet Different	Soviet Less Valuable	Soviet Dangerous	In-Group Out-Group Different	In-Group/ Out-Group Less Valuable	In-Group Out-Group Dangerous
Q 4	.1899**	.2368**	.2512***	.0733	.0807	.1226	.1382*	#.5204***	.2700***
Q17	.1969**	.3422***	.2792***	.2314**	.3400***	.2076**	.1438*	#.5041***	.3325***
Q35	.2601***	.4107***	.3856***	.2262**	.1667*	.2313**	.2311**	#.6446***	.4368***
Q41	.2276**	.5196***	.5132***	.2737***	.3754***	.2900***	.2103**	#.6552***	.4852***
Q52	.2118**	.6025***	.5691***	.4169***	.3921***	.3118***	.2183**	#.6598***	.5378***
Q56	.3206***	.5365***	.4635***	.3129***	.4949***	.3013***	.1922**	#.6096***	.4493***
Q81	.2785***	.6500***	.4901***	.2799***	.4178***	.2593***	.0920	#.6742***	.4423***
Q91	.3485***	.3562***	.1426*	.2468***	.3145***	.0788	.2156**	#.4661***	.2411**
Q 3	.2437***	.2965***	.3669***	.2169**	.1309	.1439*	.1598*	.4123***	#.5190***
Q11	.2073**	.0357	.1242	.1282	.0529	.0932	.1759*	.0900	#.4306***
Q22	.1066	.2725***	.3417***	.0008	.0345	.0511	.0537	.4041***	#.5157***
Q42	.2076**	.3312***	.4986***	.2046**	.2803***	.2883***	.1797*	.3960***	#.5882***
Q45	.2965***	.3710***	.3626***	.1921**	.2519***	.1662*	.1779*	.3118***	#.5009***
Q79	.3089***	.4508***	.5397***	.3055***	.4324***	.3597***	.1244	.3904***	#.5099***
Q84	.2737***	.4187***	.3667***	.2738***	.3145***	.2229**	.0449	.3878***	#.5225***
Q95	.2564***	.4800***	.4485***	.3586***	.3508***	.2923***	.1912**	.4444***	#.5940***

Note.

n=149 for all items

*p < .05

**p < .01

***p < .001

# indicates which scale the item is in.

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Table 4

Correlations of Each Violence Item to Each Violence Scale

(Item/Scale Matrix)

Question	Indirect Violence	Direct Violence	War
Q 5	#.5847***	.3130***	.2488***
Q 32	#.3968***	.1102	.1181
Q 49	#.6318	.2511***	.4380***
Q 50	#.4282***	.1807*	.0579
Q 57	#.6236***	.1375*	.2542***
Q 66	#.6767***	.1367*	.3312***
Q 71	#.4331***	.2280**	.1283
Q 75	#.4525***	.1593*	.1971**
Q 6	.2733***	#.5389***	.2540***
Q 14	.2109**	#.6570***	.3252***
Q 19	.2316**	#.6552***	.3466***
Q 48	.2656***	#.4820***	.2524***
Q 58	.1988***	#.4516***	.1618*
Q 64	.1894**	#.5292***	.5416***

(table continues)

Note.   n = 149 for all items

   *p < .05

  **p < .01

 ***p < .001

   # = indicates which scale the item is in.

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Table 4 (Continued)

Question	Indirect Violence	Direct Violence	War
Q 68	.0393	#.5771***	.3031***
Q 85	.2198**	#.6545***	.4865***
Q 7	.4130***	.3976***	#.6793***
Q 24	.3638***	.4390***	#.6917***
Q 27	.1898***	.3670***	#.6682***
Q 36	.3276***	.4635***	#.7911***
Q 47	.2306**	.2658***	#.4587***
Q 63	.2949***	.3520***	#.5815***
Q 67	.1732*	.2013**	#.5333***
Q 76	.1847*	.4299***	#.6114***

Note.   n = 149 for all items

*p < .05

**p < .01

***p < .001

= indicates which scale the item is in.

Table 5

Scale Reliability

	Race	Soviet	In-group/ Out-group	All Groups
Reliability of We/They Scales				
Different	.62	.74	.57	.82
Less Valuable	.79	.79	.70	.89
Dangerous	.69	.85	.59	.86
All We/They Components	.84	.90	.78	.93

Reliability of Violence Scales

Indirect Violence	Direct Violence	War	All Violence
.64	.70	.79	.84

dangerous (.59) were the only scales with reliability scores below .60 and were therefore the most questionable.

Reliability coefficients were also calculated for each scale with and without each item to assess whether the elimination of any item (or items) would increase the scale's reliability. There were no items, which if discarded, would increase the reliability by more than .03. Therefore, it was decided to maintain the scales as originally constructed.

The mean and standard deviation for each scale are reported in Table 6. The means ranged from 3.41 (slightly agree) to 5.5 (slightly disagree). The standard deviations ranged from .63 to 1.21 and are all close to 1. The range of scores on each scale was approximately 1.5 to 6.5. Therefore, the scales assessed a range of attitudes toward groups and violence.

In summary, the scales developed and used in this study discriminated well among the various constructs. The vast majority of items (96%) correlated most highly with their assigned scales, and all scales appear to be adequately reliable. The scales also assessed a range of attitudes. Some areas of minor concern are noted and should be considered if the scales are to be used in future research.

Analyses of Hypotheses

In this section each hypothesis will be reviewed and the results presented. The implications will be discussed

Table 6

Mean and Standard Deviation of Each Scale

Scale	Mean	Standard Deviation
Race Different	3.85	.89
Race Less Valuable	5.36	.97
Race Dangerous	5.32	.88
Soviet Different	4.60	.95
Soviet Less Valuable	5.35	.90
Soviet Dangerous	4.48	1.11
In-group/Out-group Different	3.41	.83
In-group/Out-group Less Valuable	5.33	.84
In-group/Out-group Dangerous	5.50	.75
All Different	3.95	.78
All Less Valuable	5.35	.79
All Dangerous	5.10	.75
All Race	4.86	.75
All Soviet	4.81	.85
All In-group/Out-group	4.75	.63
All We/They	4.81	.65
Indirect Violence	5.01	.87
Direct Violence	5.02	1.01
War	4.22	1.21
All Violence	4.75	.85

Note. Means are based on a 7 point scale.

in Chapter V.

The first set of hypotheses evaluated the proposed model of we/they relationships. The components of we/they attitudes, their relationship to each other, and the consistency of the attitudes across groups were explored.

Hypothesis 1a. The first hypothesis stated that the three specific forms of we/they relationships evaluated (race, Soviet and in-group/out-group) would form three factors which correspond to three proposed components of we/they relationships (different, less valuable and dangerous). A factor analysis with varimax rotation was completed on each of the three scales. The correlations between the items and the factor loadings are discussed below.

Race. The exploratory factor analysis on the race items revealed seven factors which account for 60.5% of the variance. These factors are presented in Appendix D. Items which significantly correlated with the computed factors are denoted. Seven items did not significantly correlate with any factors. Also, the items did not group into factors which corresponded to the three components of we/they relationships (different, less valuable, and dangerous). Therefore, a confirmatory factor analysis was attempted.

The seven factors were forced into three factors and the loadings are presented in Table 7. This analysis also failed to group the items along the proposed factors using a

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Table 7

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix for Race Forced Into Three Factors

Race Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Race Different:			
Q 1	.17476	.09084	.24803
Q 12	.17013	.56598*	-.02103
Q 40	.12088	.30902	.70132*
Q 60	.48493*	.15138	-.25968
Q 77	-.13926	.42876	.24619
Q 80	-.04070	-.01197	.30135
Q 87	.40201	.74474*	.21418
Q 92	.24409	.09896	.50191*
Race Less Valuable:			
Q 15	.61216*	.22822	-.08013
Q 26	.50689*	.07434	.27424
Q 54	.31229	.35553	-.25463
Q 69	.61295*	.02935	-.07165
Q 72	.68337*	.21910	-.21446
Q 88	.39063	.58006*	.04872
Q 94	.45850*	.24049	.17686
Q 97	.55212*	.26721	.06924

(table continues)

Note. * denotes a significant correlation.

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Table 7 (continued)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Race Dangerous:			
Q 9	.39592	-.05024	.20756
Q 16	.19094	.18529	.11201
Q 21	.44506*	-.04012	.18286
Q 25	.46134*	.12057	.22219
Q 44	.56387*	.18466	.18319
Q 62	.49466*	.15732	.23302
Q 86	.66802*	.07657	.01893
Q 96	.49346*	.03855	.07342

Note. * denotes a significant correlation.

criteria of .40 for inclusion of an item in a factor. The
amount of overlap between items and factors precludes any
valuable interpretation of the factors. Thus, Hypothesis 1a
for racism was not confirmed.

Soviet. The exploratory factor analysis for attitudes
toward the Soviets revealed six factors which account for
62.2% of the variance. These factors are presented in
Appendix E. The Soviet items were also forced into three
factors in a confirmatory factor analysis with factor
loadings shown in Table 8. As with the race scales the
Soviet scales failed to factor into units which can be
interpreted.

In-group/Out-group. The exploratory factor analysis
for in-group/out-group scales revealed seven factors which
account for 58.6% of the variance. These factors are
presented in Appendix F. The in-group/out-group scales were
also forced into three factors and the results are presented
in Table 9. As with the race and Soviet scales the in-
group/out-group scales failed to factor into units which
can be interpreted meaningfully.

In summary, Hypothesis 1a must be rejected based on the
results of this study. However, concerns regarding the
strong correlations between the proposed factors and the
possibility that an important factor has been overlooked
will be discussed below. Further conceptualization of the
model and subsequent research are highly recommended,

Table 8

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix for Soviet Forced Into

3 Factors

Soviet Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Soviet Different:			
Q 8	-.13912	.24421	.47760*
Q 23	.23654	-.06002	.45141*
Q 28	.22877	.03508	.20965
Q 39	.12988	-.14825	.39939
Q 61	-.00279	.19385	.59413*
Q 74	.35448	-.45498*	.40846
Q 83	-.00094	-.41195	.16775
Q 90	.27663	.08764	.18188
Soviet Less Valuable:			
Q 4	.48488*	-.13202	.05393
Q 17	.17029	.45565*	.17962
Q 35	.64679*	.01480	.09793
Q 41	.59660*	.27342	.11698
Q 52	.57137*	.38896	.09952
Q 56	.28690	.59947*	.21645
Q 81	.44326	.52796*	-.01601
Q 91	.07120	.33410	.27472

(table continues)

Note. * denotes a significant correlation.

Table 8 (Continued)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Soviet Dangerous:			
Q 3	.29224	.23901	.16291
Q 11	.04621	.04209	.22820
Q 22	.48142*	.06910	-.02841
Q 42	.51681*	.13291	.08899
Q 45	.24517	.20672	.15909
Q 79	.37136	.32909	.01581
Q 84	.12503	.63075*	.10544
Q 95	.48240*	.24542	.11493

Note. * denotes a significant correlation.

Table 9

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix for In-group/Out-group:

Forced Into 3 Factors

In-group/Out-group Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
In-group/Out-group Different:			
Q 8	-.13912	.24421	.47760*
Q 23	.23654	-.06002	.45141*
Q 28	.22877	.03508	.20965
Q 39	.12988	-.14825	.39939
Q 61	-.00279	.19385	.59413*
Q 74	.35448	-.45498	.40846
Q 83	-.00094	-.41195	.16775
Q 90	.27663	.08764	.18188
In-group/Outgroup Less Valuable:			
Q 4	.48488*	-.13202	.05393
Q 17	.17029	.45565*	.17962
Q 35	.64679*	.01480	.09793
Q 41	.59660*	.27342	.11698
Q 52	.57137*	.38896	.09952
Q 56	.28690	.59947*	.21645
Q 81	.44326	.52796*	-.01601
Q 91	.07120	.33410	.27472

(table continues)

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Table 9 (Continued)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
In-group/Out-group Dangerous:			
Q 3	.29224	.23901	.16291
Q 11	.04621	.04209	.22820
Q 22	.48142*	.06910	-.02841
Q 42	.51681*	.13291	.08899
Q 45	.24517	.20672	.15909
Q 79	.37136	.32909	.01581
Q 84	.12503	.63075*	.10544
Q 95	.48240*	.24542	.11493

Note. * denotes a significant correlation.

particularly in light of the significant results obtained in the analyses of the remaining hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1b. The second part of Hypothesis 1 stated that significant and positive relationships exist between the proposed components of we/they relationships and that the components build on one another. Specifically, it was hypothesized that a high score on the different scales would predict a high score on the less valuable scales and that high scores on both the different and less valuable scales would predict high scores on the dangerous scales. A path analysis (step-wise multiple regression) was used to evaluate the contribution of each component along the proposed path for the race scales, Soviet scales, in-group/out-group scales and the total we/they scales. In addition, the Pearson correlations coefficients of the 12 we/they scales to each of the other we/they scales are reported in Table 10. All of the correlations were found to be significant. Of interest were the high correlations of the race scales with the in-group/out-group scales. The implications of this finding will be discussed in the next chapter.

Race. The path analysis for the race scales (Table 11) revealed a significant positive relationship between the different and less valuable variables (R = .43, F(1,147) = 33.34, p < .001). The relationship between the different and the dangerous variables (R = .69, F(2,146) = 3.97, p <

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Table 10

The Correlation of All We/They Scales To Each Other

	Race Different	Race Less Valuable	Race Dangerous	Soviet Different	Soviet Less Valuable	Soviet Dangerous	In-Group/ Out-Group Different	In-Group/ Out-Group Less Valuable	In-Group/ Out-Group Dangerous	All Different	All Less Valuable	All Dangerous
Race Different	---	.43***	.40***	.43***	.33***	.29***	.71***	.43***	.46***	.86***	.46***	.45***
Race Less Valuable	---	---	.68***	.48***	.66***	.44***	.27***	.75***	.62***	.48***	.93***	.69***
Race Dangerous	---	---	---	.37***	.46***	.46***	.30***	.63***	.71***	.44***	.67***	.86***
Soviet Different	---	---	---	---	.61***	.55***	.42***	.42***	.39***	.77***	.58***	.53***
Soviet Less Valuable	---	---	---	---	---	.63***	.23**	.52***	.43***	.49***	.83***	.64***
Soviet Dangerous	---	---	---	---	---	---	.30***	.36***	.37***	.47***	.55***	.80***
In-Group/Out-Group Different	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	.31***	.28***	.85***	.31***	.36***
In-Group/Out-Group Less Valuable	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	.66***	.47***	.86***	.65***
In-Group/Out-Group Dangerous	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	.46***	.65***	.80***
All Different	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	.55***	.56***
All Less Valuable	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	.76***
All Dangerous	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Note. $*p \leq .05$
       $**p \leq .01$
       $***p \leq .001$

Table 11

Path Analysis for Race

Step 1: Different to Less Valuable

		Less Valuable			sr^2 change	significance level
	R	F	B	β		
Different	.43	33.34	.47	.43	---	<.001

Step 2: Different and Less Valuable to Dangerous

		Dangerous			sr^2 change	significance level
	R	F	B	β		
Less Valuable	.68	124.93	.56	.62	.46	<.001
Different	.69	3.97	.13	.13	.01	.048

.05) and the less valuable and the dangerous variables (R =

significant. The column labeled "sr^2 change" contains the amount of the variance added to R^2 by each variable. Therefore, the less valuable variable accounted for 46% of the variance. The different variable explains an additional (significant) 1% of the variance. Hypothesis 1b was confirmed for the race scales.

Soviet. The path analysis for the Soviet scales (Table 12) also revealed significant positive relationships between all of the variables. The less valuable variable explains 40% of the variance while the different variable explains an additional 4% of the variance. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b was confirmed for the Soviet scales.

In-group/Out-group. The path analysis for in-group/out-group scales (Table 13) revealed a positive and significant relationship between the different and less valuable variables and between the less valuable and dangerous variables. However, the relationship between the different variable and the dangerous variable was not found to be significant. Therefore, the less valuable variable accounts for most of the variance in the dangerous variable and the difference variable does not add a significant predictive component to the dangerous variable for in-group/out-group. Thus, for the in-group/out-group scales Hypothesis 1b was partially confirmed.

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Table 12

Path Analysis for Soviets

Step 1: Different to Less Valuable

| | | Less Valuable | | | | |
	R	F	B	β	sr^2 change	significance level
Different	.61	88.30	.58	.61	---	<.001

Step 2: Different and Less Valuable to Dangerous

| | | Dangerous | | | | |
	R	F	B	β	sr^2 change	significance level
Less Valuable	.63	98.33	.57	.47	.40	<.001
Different	.67	11.72	.31	.27	.04	<.001

Table 13

Path Analysis for In-group/Out-group

Step 1: Different to Less Valuable

| | | Less Valuable | | | | |
	R	F	B	β	sr^2 change	significance level
Different	.31	15.34	.31	.31	---	<.001

Step 2: Different and Less Valuable to Dangerous

| | | Dangerous | | | | |
	R	F	B	β	sr^2 change	significance level
Less Valuable	.66	112.94	.57	.63	.43	<.001
Different	.66	1.52	.73	.08	.01	.219

We/They. The path analysis for we/they relationships (all groups together) revealed a highly significant and positive relationship between all variables (different to less valuable, and different and less valuable to dangerous). The results are reported in Table 14. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b was strongly supported by the results of this study.

Hypothesis 1c. This part of the hypothesis stated that a significant and positive correlation exists between attitudes toward other races, Soviets and in-group/out-groups. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported in Table 15. The analysis revealed a correlation of .62 (p < .001) between attitudes toward people of other races and the Soviets as measured in this study. The correlation between attitudes toward people of other races and the in-group/out-group was .85 (p < .001). The correlation between attitudes toward the Soviets and the in-group/out-group was also positive and significant (.57, p < .001). Therefore, Hypothesis 1c was fully supported by the data; race, Soviet and in-group/out-group attitudes were positively and significantly correlated as they were measured in this study.

The second set of hypotheses evaluated the link between we/they relationships and the acceptance of planned violence. Various aspects of this link will be explored.

Hypothesis 2a. This hypothesis stated that the

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Table 14

Path Analysis for We/They

Step 1: Different to Less Valuable

		Less Valuable			sr^2 change	significance level
	R	F	B	β		
Different	.	64.53	.	.	---	<.001

Step 2: Different and Less Valuable to Dangerous

		Dangerous			sr^2 change	significance level
	R	F	B	β		
Less Valuable	.75	194.02	.	.64	.57	<.001
Different	.	10.39	.	.20	.03	<.001

Table 15

Analysis of the Correlation of Attitudes Regarding Race,

Soviets and In-group/Out-group

Group	Race	Soviet	In-group/ Out-group
Race	---	---	---
Soviet	.62***	---	---
In-group/ Out-group	.85***	.57***	---

Note. n=149

***p < .001

acceptance of the various forms of violence (indirect violence, direct violence and war) would positively correlate with we/they attitudes as measured in this study. The Pearson correlation coefficients for this analysis are reported in Table 16. The race different, race less valuable and race dangerous variables were found to positively and significantly correlate with the acceptance of all forms of violence (indirect violence, direct violence and war).

All correlations between the Soviet different, Soviet less valuable and Soviet dangerous scales and the acceptance of indirect violence, direct violence and war scales were also significant and positive except for one correlation. No significant relationship was found between the Soviet different variable and the acceptance of direct violence variable.

Similarly, the correlation between the in-group/out-group different variable and the direct violence variable was not significant. All other relationships between the three components of in-group/out-group attitudes and the three forms of violence were significant, and will be discussed below.

Finally, the total different, total less valuable and total dangerous scales significantly and positively correlated with the three acceptance of violence scales. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a was predominantly supported by the results of this study with the exception of two

Table 16

The Relationship of We/They Attitudes and the Acceptance of Violence

	Violence Scales		
We/They Scales	Indirect Violence	Direct Violence	War
Race Different	.32***	.19**	.26***
Race Less Valuable	.59***	.41***	.39***
Race Dangerous	.50***	.39***	.42***
Soviet Different	.26***	.13	.23**
Soviet Less Valuable	.40***	.23**	.27***
Soviet Dangerous	.37***	.28***	.49***
In-group/Out-group Different	.24**	.06	.16*
In-group/Out-group Less Valuable	.48***	.36***	.36***
In-group/Out-group Dangerous	.48***	.30***	.29***
Total Different	.33***	.16*	.26***
Total Less Valuable	.56***	.39***	.39***
Total Dangerous	.54***	.39***	.50***

Note. n = 149

***p < .001

**p < .01

*p < .05

relationships (Soviet different to direct violence and in-group/out-group different to direct violence).

Hypothesis 2b. This hypothesis proposed that the less valuable and dangerous variables would correlate more strongly with the acceptance of violence scales than would the different scales. A visual evaluation of Table 16 supported this hypothesis. For all groups (race, Soviet, in-group/out-group and total we/they) the less valuable and dangerous variables more strongly correlated with indirect violence, direct violence and war variables than did the different variable. Therefore, Hypothesis 2b was supported by the results of this study.

Hypothesis 2c. This hypothesis proposed that the race and in-group/out-group variables (different, less valuable and dangerous) would correlate more strongly with acceptance of indirect violence than would the Soviet variable. Pearson correlation coefficients for the analysis of the relationships between the group variables (race, Soviet, in-group/out-group and we/they) to the acceptance of all forms of violence are reported in Table 17. All four group variables were found to positively and significantly correlate with the acceptance of indirect violence as measured in this study (race total: $r = .58$; Soviet total: $r = .40$; in-group/out-group total: $r = .51$; and we/they: $r = .56$). The race and in-group/out-group variables were found to have a stronger relationship to the acceptance of

Table 17

The Relationship of Attitudes Toward Groups and the
Acceptance of Violence

We/They Scales	Acceptance of Violence			
	Indirect Violence	Direct Violence	War	All Violence
Race Total	.58***	.41***	.43***	.58***
Soviet Total	.40***	.26***	.40***	.43***
In-group/ Out-group Total	.51***	.31***	.35***	.47***
We/They	.56***	.36***	.45***	.56***

Note. n = 149

   ***p < .001

indirect violence than did the Soviet variable. Thus Hypothesis 2c was supported by this study.

Hypothesis 2d. The final hypothesis proposed that the Soviet variable would correlate more strongly with the acceptance of war variable than would the race and in-group/out-group variables. This hypothesis was not supported by the data. The race variable correlated most strongly with the acceptance of war (.43), followed by the Soviet variable (.40) and finally the in-group/out-group variable (.35). The total we/they variable was also positively and significantly correlated with the acceptance of war variable (.45). Therefore, Hypothesis 2d was not supported by this study--attitudes toward the Soviets were not most strongly correlated with acceptance of war as they were measured in this study.

In summary, two hypotheses (1a and 2d) were rejected. The variables of race, Soviet, in-group/out-group and we/they did not factor into interpretable units which corresponded with the components different, less valuable and dangerous. In addition, attitudes toward the Soviets did not correlate most strongly with the acceptance of war.

All remaining hypotheses (1b, 1c, 2a, 2b and 2c) were supported by the data. The "different" variable was found to positively and significantly predict the "less valuable" variable, and both of these variables were found to significantly predict the "dangerous" variable (the path was

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confirmed). Attitudes toward people of other races, the Soviets and the in-group/out-group were found to positively and significantly correlate. The acceptance of violence variables and most we/they attitude variables were also found to significantly and positively correlate. Less valuable and dangerous variables were more strongly correlated with the acceptance of violence variables than was the difference variable. Finally, race and in-group/out-group variables were more strongly correlated with the acceptance of indirect violence than was the Soviet variable.

Additional Findings

A post-hoc analysis of the relationship of we/they attitudes and the acceptance of violence was performed. However, these results should be interpreted with caution and further research is necessary due to their post-hoc nature.

Path analyses (step-wise and hierarchical multiple regressions) were completed for each group (race, Soviet, in-group/out-group and we/they) to the acceptance of each form of violence (indirect violence, direct violence, war and all violence) and are summarized in Tables 18-21. For each dependent variable (indirect violence, direct violence and war) the first multiple regression assessed the direct path from dangerous to that form of violence. The second multiple regression assessed the path from dangerous to that

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Table 18

Path Analysis for the Components of Race to the

Acceptance of Violence

Part 1: Indirect Violence (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Race Dangerous (IV)	48.16	<.001	---

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Race Less Valuable (IV)	80.48	<.001	.35
Race Different (IV)	1.17	.339	.01
Race Dangerous (IV)	3.16	.077	.01

Part 2: Direct Violence (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Race Dangerous (IV)	27.04	<.001	---

(table continues)

Table 18 (Continued)

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Race Less Valuable (IV)	29.70	<.001	.17
Race Different (IV)	.06	.872	.00
Race Dangerous (IV)	4.44	.037	.03

Part 3: War (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Race Dangerous (IV)	30.87	<.001	---

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Race Less Valuable (IV)	25.78	<.001	.15
Race Different (IV)	1.86	.188	.01
Race Dangerous (IV)	6.97	.009	.04

(table continues)

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Table 18 (Continued)

Part 4: All Violence (DV)

Step 1

	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Race Dangerous (IV)	58.77	<.001	---

Step 2

	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Race Less Valuable (IV)	67.24	<.001	.31
Race Different (IV)	1.45	.210	.01
Race Dangerous (IV)	9.04	.003	.04

Table 19

Path Analysis for the Components of Soviet to the

Acceptance of Violence

Part 1: Indirect Violence (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Soviet Dangerous (IV)	23.42	<.001	---

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Soviet Less Valuable (IV)	27.37	<.001	.16
Soviet Different (IV)	.06	.902	.00
Soviet Dangerous (IV)	4.29	.040	.02

Part 2: Direct Violence (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Soviet Dangerous (IV)	12.65	<.001	---

(table continues)

Table 19 (Continued)

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Soviet Less Valuable (IV)	8.57	.004	.06
Soviet Different (IV)	.04	.933	.00
Soviet Dangerous (IV)	5.32	.023	.03

Part 3: War (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Soviet Dangerous (IV)	46.48	<.001	---

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Soviet Less Valuable (IV)	11.55	<.001	.07
Soviet Different (IV)	.98	.428	.01
Soviet Dangerous (IV)	31.70	.000	.17

(table continues)

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Table 19 (Continued)

Part 4: All Violence (DV)

Step 1

	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Soviet Dangerous (IV)	43.83	<.001	---

Step 2

	F	significance level	sr^2 change
Soviet Less Valuable (IV)	22.34	<.001	.13
Soviet Different (IV)	.24	.623	.00
Soviet Dangerous (IV)	19.99	<.001	.11

Table 20

Path Analysis for the Components of In-group/Out-group to
the Acceptance of Violence

Part 1: Indirect Violence (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
In-group/Out-group Dangerous (IV)	43.25	<.001	---

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
In-group/Out-group Less Valuable (IV)	44.31	<.001	.23
In-group/Out-group Different (IV)	1.84	.081	.01
In-group/Out-group Dangerous (IV)	8.36	.004	.04

Part 2: Direct Violence (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
In-group/Out-group Dangerous (IV)	14.17	<.001	---

(table continues)

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Table 20 (Continued)

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
In-group/Out-group Less Valuable (IV)	22.19	<.001	.13
In-group/Out-group Different (IV)	.51	.441	.00
In-group/Out-group Dangerous (IV)	1.16	.283	.01

Part 3: War (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
In-group/Out-group Dangerous (IV)	13.56	<.001	---

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
In-group/Out-group Less Valuable (IV)	22.27	<.001	.13
In-group/Out-group Different (IV)	.39	.581	.00
In-group/Out-group Dangerous (IV)	.69	.408	.00

(table continues)

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Table 20 (Continued)

Part 4: All Violence (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
In-group/Out-group Dangerous (IV)	32.71	<.001	---

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
In-group/Out-group Less Valuable (IV)	46.44	<.001	.24
In-group/Out-group Different (IV)	.22	.616	.00
In-group/Out-group Dangerous (IV)	3.57	.060	.02

Table 21

Path Analysis for the Components of We/They to the

Acceptance of Violence

Part 1: Indirect Violence (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
All Dangerous (IV)	59.88	<.001	---

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
All Less Valuable (IV)	68.88	<.001	.32
All Different (IV)	.14	.819	.00
All Dangerous (IV)	6.41	.012	.03

Part 2: Direct Violence (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
All Dangerous (IV)	26.90	<.001	---

(table continues)

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Table 21 (Continued)

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
All Less Valuable (IV)	25.65	<.001	.15
All Different (IV)	.75	.212	.00
All Dangerous (IV)	5.72	.018	.03

Part 3: War (DV)

Step 1	F	significance level	sr^2 change
All Dangerous (IV)	49.80	<.001	---

Step 2	F	significance level	sr^2 change
All Less Valuable (IV)	26.26	<.001	.15
All Different (IV)	.58	.481	.00
All Dangerous (IV)	19.24	<.001	.10

(table continues)

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Table 21 (Continued)

Part 4: All Violence (DV)

Step 1

	F	significance level	sr^2 change
All Dangerous (IV)	78.33	<.001	---

Step 2

	F	significance level	sr^2 change
All Less Valuable (IV)	60.88	<.001	.29
All Different (IV)	.02	.982	.00
All Dangerous (IV)	18.61	<.001	.08

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form of violence after the other variables (different and less valuable) were assessed. Thus, the second multiple regression determined whether perceiving someone as dangerous related to an increased acceptance of violence after the effects of perceiving them as different and less valuable were considered. The first step of Tables 18-21 shows that for each we/they group perceiving groups as more dangerous significantly predicts greater acceptance of all forms of violence.

Step 2 of Tables 18-21 indicate the ability of the dangerous variable, added as the last component, to predict the acceptance of violence. The amount of variance that each of the components add is also reported. The results indicated that the dangerous component, added after the different and less valuable components was not always a significant predictor of acceptance of violence (significance was found in some cases but not others). These results, along with the results of the path analyses reported earlier, also indicate that the less valuable component accounts for a major portion of the variance. Therefore, the less valuable component was the most significant in predicting the acceptance of violence. Tables 18-21 provide a summary of the results.

The possible implications of all the findings in this study and the need for further research will be discussed in the next section.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the relationship between perceptions of groups of people and the acceptance of various forms of planned violence against others. An attitude questionnaire which assessed attitudes toward people of different ethnic groups, the Soviets, and in-group/out-group in general, as well as the acceptance of indirect violence, direct violence and war was used. One of the major findings was that devaluing other groups had a strong relationship to the acceptance of violence. The components evaluated were 1) perceiving others as separate and different, 2) perceiving others as less valuable than one's own group, and 3) perceiving others as threatening or dangerous to one's own group. Although all components were found to have a significant relationship to most or all forms of violence, the "different" component was less strongly related and less predictive of the acceptance of planned violence than were the "less valuable" and "dangerous" components. These findings and their

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implications will be discussed below.

Major Findings

There were several findings in this study which are of
importance both in understanding the structure of attitudes
toward out-groups and the relationship of these attitudes to
the acceptance of violence. The hypothesis regarding the
model of attitudes toward groups presented in this study
will be discussed first, followed by the various
relationships of the components to each other.

The results indicate that perceiving others as
different is necessary to the perception of others as less
valuable, and that both perceptions (different and less
valuable) are necessary to the perception of others as
dangerous (See Figure 2). Therefore, the proposed path
along the three components of attitudes was supported.
This path was found to be true across all groups which were
evaluated in the study (race, Soviet, in-group/out-group).
In addition, it was consistently shown that the link between
the perceptions of others as different to the perception of
others as dangerous was significant but the difference
variable did not add much variance to the prediction of the
perception of dangerous after the less valuable variable was
added. Therefore, the assertion, which was discussed in the
literature review, that it is not the perception of
differences which is the problem, but the evaluation of
those differences (Allport, 1958; Apostle et al., 1983;

Note. Thickness of arrows indicate the strength of the relationships.

Figure 2. The Relationship of the Components of Attitudes Toward Groups and the Acceptance of Violence

Reardon, 1985; Schaef, 1981) was fully supported. This finding is very important and the implications will be discussed below.

Another finding of major importance was the strong link between all components of we/they relationships, across all groups evaluated, to all forms of violence evaluated. The results clearly demonstrated that the way others were perceived strongly related to the acceptance of violence against groups. As in the path analyses, however, one component--the perception of others as different--was consistently less strongly related to the acceptance of violence than the other two components. The perception of "differentness" was shown to have a weaker relationship to the acceptance of violence. Thus, one possible application of these findings is a focus on the two components-- devaluing of others and the perception of others as threatening--in attempts to diminish violence against groups. Future research regarding the origin of devaluing others is also indicated based on these findings.

In addition, it was shown that the perception of others as dangerous alone was not sufficient for the acceptance of violence. All three components of the model were found to relate to and improve the ability to predict one's acceptance of violence. Therefore, all components of the model are important to our understanding of the acceptance of violence.

The strength of various relationships between the constructs studied was also evaluated. It was found that the tendency to view the world in terms of we/they relationships was consistent across the groups evaluated (race, Soviet, in-group/out-group). In other words, the less favorable someone's views toward other races were the less favorable their views toward the Soviets and the out-group tended to be. Also, the various forms of we/they relationships (race, Soviet, in-group/out-group and the total we/they) were related to the various forms of acceptance of violence (indirect violence, direct violence, war and all violence) The strength of these relationships varied somewhat. Attitudes toward people of other ethnic groups were found to relate most strongly with the acceptance of all forms of violence. This was a surprise in that it was predicted that attitudes toward the Soviets would relate most strongly to the acceptance of war.

The strong relationship between views of other ethnic groups and the acceptance of war, along with the high correlation among items on the in-group/out-group scales to the race scales, present an interesting possibility. It appears likely that when people were asked to think in terms of groups of people, they most often thought along ethnic lines, rather than national lines (or perhaps any other lines--e.g. sex, sexual preference, religion). In addition, it was the perceptions of people from other races, even more

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than perceptions of "enemy" nations or peoples, that related most strongly to the acceptance of indirect violence, direct violence and war.

In summary, all three components of we/they relationships were shown to have a significant link to the acceptance of all forms of violence, and these components build on one another. One component--the perception of others as different--was less strongly related to the violence factors than were the other two components (less valuable and dangerous). Finally, attitudes toward other groups were strongly correlated. However, perceptions of people of different ethnic groups were most strongly related to the acceptance of violence. The implications of these findings will now be discussed.

Implications

The study of attitudes regarding peace and nuclear war in particular began in 1961 (Jacobs, 1989). Jacobs, in her thorough review and evaluation of psychology's role in peace studies, regards attitude research as part of psychology's advocacy role. The results of attitude research are used primarily to assess and suggest ways to change public opinion through education and media campaigns, for example. However, it is believed the results of this attitudinal research have implications for both public opinion and policymaking.

Psychologists have struggled with questions of whether

psychology has a role in peace studies, and how the problem should be defined so as to conduct useful and relevant research. Both of these issues will be addressed in the context of the findings of this study.

The results of this inquiry provide evidence for a strong link between the perceptions of others and the acceptance of various forms of violence including war. The study of perceptions, attitudes and how they are acquired is clearly within the domain of psychology. Therefore, these results support the need for psychologists to take a role in peace studies. The study of perceptions and attitudes are but two areas of peace studies in which psychology can and should take a role (see Jacobs, 1989); however, these areas are relevant and of great importance. The results of this study clearly indicate that the way we perceive others, and in particular the tendency to devalue and see others as threatening, were related to the acceptance of violence. Clarification of this link, and the mechanisms for change should be further evaluated.

Another aspect of psychology's role in peace studies has been in education (Jacobs, 1989). The results of this study would be useful to educational programs for children, adolescents and adults. For example, in parent education classes parents could be taught about the importance of attitudes toward others and how these attitudes are passed on to children. In addition, school curriculums for

children and college students are beginning to incorporate peace education. These curriculums would benefit from the inclusion of the findings in this study.

The question regarding how to approach peace studies is very controversial. The discourse in the literature regarding specific or general approaches was discussed in the literature review (c.f., Gilbert, 1988; Staub, 1988; Watzlawick, 1974; Weick, 1984). Several authors have proposed a link between attitudes toward people of other races (e.g. Allport, 1958; Silverstein, 1989), gender (e.g. Brock-Utne, 1985; Johnson, 1987; Reardon, 1985; Roberts, 1984) and the various forms of violence (Johnson, 1976; Rosenthal & Johnson, 1989; Staub, 1988) and difficulties in creating peace. These authors argue that broad definitions of peace are necessary in order to create long-lasting change. The results of this study support the need for broad definitions of peace.

The strong link between attitudes toward others and all forms of violence supports those who argue that peace should be defined in a broad manner to include all forms of violence and justice for all groups of people. This strong relationship also provides evidence that some broader underlying concept is necessary to understand and change the way people perceive others and thus accept violence against them. It is proposed here that we/they relationships meet the criteria for such a concept and that there are at least

three components (different, less valuable and dangerous) of we/they relationships. Further conceptualization of the model is suggested to evaluate other possible components.

As discussed in the literature review, many authors argue that we/they relationships are inherent in hierarchical systems which place differing values on human beings (Eisler, 1985; Criss & Johnson, 1989; Reardon, 1985; Roberts, 1984; Schaef, 1981; Spretnak, 1983), and there is some evidence (from the post-hoc analysis) that this component--perceiving others as less valuable--is most strongly linked to the acceptance of violence. Systems which require "social rungs on a ladder" appear to be conducive to we/they relationships and the related acceptance of violence. Thus, profound changes in the way we organize our world may be indicated.

Another component--the perception of others as different--although significantly linked to the acceptance of violence, has the weakest link of the three components to the acceptance of violence. This finding is quite important. The results indicate it is possible for someone to perceive others as different, but not devalue them, perceive them as dangerous or accept violence against them. Therefore, an attitude which allows the perception of differences, but is accepting of and even values diversity seems to be possible. However, this link was not specifically evaluated, and further research is indicated.

Another major finding, that the relationship between attitudes toward different ethnic groups and the acceptance of all forms of violence is strongest, needs exploration. It seems particularly important to evaluate this hypothesis within the current social context. Jacobs (1989) discusses contextualism which holds that the purpose of scientific work is, among other things, to reveal the contexts in which a theory holds or does not hold. Thus, it is important that future research evaluate the contexts in which the model presented here holds or does not hold.

The early conceptualization of this study took place during a different era (1986) in Soviet-American relations (Jacobs, 1989; Silverstein, 1989). The build up of nuclear arms was reaching a new high, the rhetoric between the United States and the Soviet Union a new low. Since that time the Cold War has thawed somewhat, arms agreements and unilateral concessions are in the news, Gorbachev was cheered in the streets of New York, Bush in the streets of Hungary.

The media's emphasis on the cold war has decreased. However, it appears that racial problems have received greater attention. The media is full of reports of an increase in hate crimes (e.g., Barett, 1989). "Skinheads" vandalize synagogues, and attack mixed racial couples and homosexuals. Within this context the strong relationship between attitudes toward different ethnic groups and the

acceptance of all forms of violence appears very ominous. It is also for this reason that replication of these findings is highly recommended. It is clear that the context in which the questions asked in this study were raised has changed. Will the results of this study hold in a different context, another time when general attitudes have shifted again?

If the strongest link between the acceptance of war and attitudes toward other groups continues to be along ethnic lines, the importance of a broad definition of peace cannot be overstated. The absence of war, without changes in perceptions toward others, will support the military definition of peace noted by Keen (1986); peace is "permanent prehostility". This is a definition of peace we can no longer afford--the cost is too much!

As the process of discovery often leaves the curious with more questions than answers, such is the case in this study. The next section will present suggestions for further research.

Limitations of the Current Study and Suggestions for
Future Research

In this section I will address possible improvements in this study. Also, several ideas for further research will be discussed.

Current Study. As was noted in the results, all of the scales had sufficient reliability given the scope of this

study. However, two scales (in-group/out-group different and in-group/out-group dangerous) had reliability coefficients between .50 and .60. It is highly recommended that these scales be further evaluated and modified, if necessary, to improve the reliability. Also, several items correlated more strongly with another scale than their own. These items should also be evaluated further and modified or eliminated if need be.

All scales were found to have adequate reliability. However, it was predicted that the responses to the scales regarding each group would factor into the three proposed components of we/they relationships--the perception of others as different, less valuable and dangerous. The results did not support this model. There are three explanations for this finding which appear feasible. It is possible that the model is flawed and that the results of the factor analysis demonstrate this. However, before drawing that conclusion the other explanations should be considered. In order to obtain meaningful and interpretable results from a factor analysis, independence of the factors is required (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1983). The strong correlation found between various items and various scales indicates that the constructs in this study are strongly interrelated. Therefore, these strong relationships between the factors may have distorted the data. In addition, it is necessary that <u>all</u> major factors be evaluated in order to

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obtain separate and interpretable factors in a factor analysis. Thus, if any major component was left out, meaningless factors would result. Therefore, the model presented here needs further conceptualization and evaluation in subsequent research. It is possible that a component may be missing, or that the components should be divided into smaller components. In addition, an oblique rotation is suggested in future factor analyses due to the strong correlation between the scales which indicates that the factors are not independent. The significant relationship of the components defined here to the acceptance of violence is of such importance that further exploration of the model is clearly indicated.

In addition, it is possible that the direct violence scale did not exclusively evaluate the acceptance of planned violence. Although it is impossible to determine how items were interpreted by the subjects, several direct violence items were ambiguous and could lend themselves to interpretation of a "heat of the moment" type of violence. This is particularly interesting in that the correlations of the we/they attitudes to the acceptance of direct violence were weaker than the other forms of violence. Further research regarding this possibility is strongly recommended.

There are several other limitations in this study. The sample was reasonably representative of Southern California. However, it was obtained in a haphazard manner and a

stratified sample would be preferable. It is also recommended that the study be replicated with other subject populations to determine the generalizability of the results.

No attempt was made to measure the behavioral component of actual acts of violence. Therefore, this study cannot provide information regarding the relationship between perception of others and actual willingness to act violently. It would be very interesting to replicate this study with subjects who have acted violently (e.g., people convicted of hate crimes or men who have enlisted and fought in a war). However, it should be stressed that most people do not have the opportunity, or do not choose to act violently themselves. Yet many people appear to accept or do nothing to stop violence, whether the violence is "legal" (e.g., armies, poverty, infant mortality) or "illegal" (e.g., gangs, hate crimes). Therefore, the concept of acceptance of violence is a very important and prevalent cultural reality.

Related Research. Numerous ideas for further research seem to follow from this study. First, replications of the study are recommended with parallel measures of attitudes toward other types of groups (e.g., sex, sexual preference, religion) to evaluate whether the same strong link between various forms of we/they relationships and the acceptance of violence hold in these other contexts. The model could also

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be tested following various historical events and at different points in time to evaluate the consistency of the components of we/they attitudes in these contexts.

In addition, it would be helpful to test competing models of the relationship of the concepts different, less valuable and dangerous to each other. Competing models of the relationship of these components to the acceptance of violence would also be useful.

The component "less valuable" was found to be significantly related to the acceptance of violence. An extensive evaluation of the origin of devaluing of others is highly recommended.

There are numerous theories regarding the human "need" or "capacity" to perceive the world in terms of "we" and "they". They range from intolerance of ambiguity (Allport, 1958; Keen, 1986; McClosky, 1967; Staub, 1988) to ethnocentrism (Kelman, 1986; White, 1984; Sumner, 1906). These theories have not been empirically evaluated (also see Silverstein, 1989).

There are numerous other questions which could be the focus of future research. Can we change perceptions regarding groups of people? How can we change these perceptions? Do government and educational programs such as cultural exchanges have an effect on we/they relationships? Do changes in perceptions lead to changes in the acceptance of violence? What kind of changes lead to an acceptance or

appreciation of diversity? It has been suggested that greater self-acceptance is linked to greater acceptance of others (Erikson, 1985; Etheredge, 1978; Jervis, 1976; Keen, 1986; Reardon, 1985). Also, what is the link between attitudes toward others and attitudes toward weapons? All of these questions merit additional research.

The importance of devaluing other people (ethnocentrism) has been a focus of this dissertation. However, other forms of devaluation need to be explored as well. A new and exciting area of exploration focuses on the human tendency to devalue everything not human. According to ecofeminism (Capra, 1982; Harman, 1984; Milbrath, 1988) humans consider themselves superior to other species and products of nature. It is proposed that this tendency endangers other species and the whole planet (a form of extreme violence which is accepted). Milbrath (1988) describes two paradigms. The "Dominant Social Paradigm" which places lower value on nature, has compassion only for those "near and dear", considers risk acceptable in order to maximize wealth, does not limit growth and accepts the "present society" and "old politics". In contrast, the "New Environmental Paradigm" places a high value on nature, has generalized compassion for other species and calls for a new society and new politics. The "Dominant Social Paradigm" can be seen as an extension of ethnocentrism. In fact, Johnson and Friedman (1989) found a link between hate of the

out-group, the acceptance of war and attitudes regarding the environment. This link merits further exploration.

Harman (1984) presents goals and a vision for world peace. It is this vision which provides the direction and energy for this dissertation and future research in peace psychology....

> Thus the goal of sustained world
> peace is the goal of a global commonwealth
> in which war has no legitimacy anywhere;
> in which every planetary citizen has a
> reasonable chance to create through his or
> her own efforts a decent life for self and
> family; in which men and women live in
> harmony with the earth and its creatures,
> cooperating to create and maintain a
> wholesome environment for all; in which
> there is an ecology of different cultures,
> the diversity of which is appreciated and
> supported, in which there is a deep and
> shared sense of meaning in life itself--
> meaning that does not have to be sought in
> mindless acquisition and consumption. (p. 79)

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INFORMED CONSENT

I hereby agree to participate in a research project which is being conducted by Alane Miller-Kustek as part of the requirements for a doctorate in psychology. The project is designed to assess attitudes about groups of people and problem resolution. The study involves a packet of paper and pencil questionnaires which will take about one hour to complete.

I understand I may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time without negative consequences. I understand that my identity will not be revealed and will be kept in strict confidence. No information that identifies me will be released without my separate consent, and all identifiable information such as signed consent forms will be kept separately from the questionnaires in a locked cabinet.

I understand the slight possibility exists that in the course of completing the questionnaires some uncomfortable feelings may arise. If so, the investigator will be available to talk to, and if necessary, a referral for psychological assistance will be made. However questions are not of a personal nature.

I understand that although there are no direct benefits, this research will benefit the study of problem resolution. If I have any questions about the project or my participation I may contact Alane Miller-Kustek at (818) 986-1666, or Paula Johnson, Ph.D. at (213) 483-7034. I can obtain a summary of the general results following the study if I so request. (You may also contact either of us at California School of Professional Psychology, 2235 Beverly Blvd., Los Angeles, CA., 90057)

_____   _____

Subject Signature   Date

_____

Witness Signature

APPENDIX B

Below you will find statements regarding groups of people and situations. You will probably agree with some and disagree with others. Please give your true opinions. This is not a test, so there are no right or wrong answers. Please do not spend too much time on any one statement; your first impression is preferred. Please read each statement carefully and circle the number that is closest to how you feel or what you believe.

A "1" indicates that you STRONGLY AGREE with the statement

A "2" indicates that you AGREE with the statement

A "3" indicates that you SLIGHTLY AGREE with the statement

A "4" indicates that you have NO OPINION or are exactly in between

A "5" indicates that you SLIGHTLY DISAGREE with the statement

A "6" indicates that you DISAGREE with the statement

A "7" indicates that you STRONGLY DISAGREE with the statement

		STRONGLY AGREE					STRONGLY DISAGREE	
1.	Other cultures seem mysterious and different to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2.	Despite problems the Soviets are much like us.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.	I am afraid of people from groups other than mine.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4.	I tend to like people more if they are like me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5.	There are good reasons that people are paid differently for the same job.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

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		STRONGLY AGREE					STRONGLY DISAGREE	
6.	Physical violence seems to be unavoidable.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7.	The best way to resolve certain conflicts is with military action.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8.	People of my own group are no different than people of other groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9.	Other ethnic groups take things away from my ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10.	The Soviets are basically inferior to Americans.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11.	I do not feel vulnerable around people from groups other than mine.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12.	People are all basically the same regardless of their ethnic origin.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13.	The Soviets cannot be trusted.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14.	There are times when the only way to solve conflict is to plan to injure the opposition.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15.	People from ethnic groups different than my own are not as kind.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16.	People from different ethnic backgrounds are no more dangerous than anyone else.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

		STRONGLY AGREE					STRONGLY DISAGREE	
17.	Interacting with people from many backgrounds enriches my day to day life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18.	Soviet people are similar to Americans.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19.	There are circumstances in which a person has a right to plan to harm someone.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20.	We will not be secure as long as the USSR exists.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21.	When I am in a group of people who are from a different ethnic group than my own, I feel afraid.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22.	I feel safe with people from many different backgrounds.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
23.	There are major differences between groups of people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24.	The use of nuclear weapons is justified in some situations.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25.	I feel safe with people from all types of ethnic backgrounds.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26.	I value people of my same ethnic group more than others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27.	War is unacceptable.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

		STRONGLY AGREE					STRONGLY DISAGREE	
28.	I find the differences between myself and people from other groups to be less important than the similarities.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
29.	The Soviets think differently than we do.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30.	We could benefit from a better relationship with the Soviets.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
31.	The Soviets are evil.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
32.	There will always be people in poverty.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
33.	Soviet's concerns are much like ours.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
34.	The Soviets intend to wipe out democracy.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
35.	I prefer being with people of the same background as my own.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
36.	There are situations in which we have no choice but to go to war.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
37.	We must always be cautious with the Soviets.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
38.	Americans are better at most things than the Soviets.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
39.	The world is made up of many groups of people who are very different from each other.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

		STRONGLY AGREE					STRONGLY DISAGREE	
40.	There are many differences, besides color, between me and people from other ethnic groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
41.	I don't like people from groups different than mine.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
42.	People from groups other than mine pose a threat to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
43.	We cannot let our guard down with the Soviets.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
44.	People of ethnic groups other than mine tend to be more threatening.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
45.	People from groups other than mine are no more dangerous than anyone else.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
46.	The Soviets pose no direct threat to us.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
47.	We will always have wars.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
48.	We should allow criminals to kill each other off.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
49.	The best system requires there be lower, middle and upper classes.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
50.	All people should have equal access to good medical care.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

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		STRONGLY AGREE					STRONGLY DISAGREE	
51.	The Soviet people are fundamentally different from us.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
52.	Other groups are not as valuable as my own.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
53.	We could learn some things from the Soviets.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
54.	I find interaction with people of different ethnic backgrounds beneficial.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
55.	The more the Soviets know about us the more vulnerable we are.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
56.	I enjoy learning about groups other than my own.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
57.	We should not let all small groups in society have equal say in the way things are run.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
58.	Talking is always a better alternative than violent action.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
59.	We have no reason to fear the Soviets.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
60.	I have little in common with people of different ethnic groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
61.	All people are the same.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
62.	I feel people of different ethnic groups pose a threat to my security.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
63.	We should fight a war if our values are threatened.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

		STRONGLY AGREE					STRONGLY DISAGREE	

64. There is nothing wrong with attacking someone who threatens violence.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

65. The Soviets are likeable.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

66. Sometimes people take equality too far.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

67. If attacked militarily we should respond with military action.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

68. Fighting is never the best way to resolve a problem.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

69. People from other ethnic groups rarely achieve as much as people from my own ethnic group.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

70. The Soviets often act in ways that are wrong.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

71. All people should be treated equally in the work place.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

72. People from my own ethnic group are better than people from other ethnic groups.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

73. Soviets and Americans are basically equal.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

74. There will always be groups of people who are different than my group.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

75. It bothers me that some people die of hunger.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

		STRONGLY AGREE					STRONGLY DISAGREE	
76.	It is honorable to fight in a war.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
77.	There are no differences between people of different ethnic origins.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
78.	The Soviets are different than us in every way.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
79.	People from other groups would harm me if they had a chance.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
80.	People are different because of the cultures they grew up in.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
81.	My group is better than any other group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
82.	The Soviets experience things differently than we do.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
83.	Groups of people develop different ways of experiencing the world.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
84.	There is no reason to fear someone just because they come from a different group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
85.	There will always be situations in which we have to plan to hurt someone.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
86.	People from different ethnic backgrounds intend me harm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
87.	People are the same all over the world regardless of their race.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

		STRONGLY AGREE					STRONGLY DISAGREE	
88.	People from different ethnic groups are equal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
89.	The Americans are superior to Soviets.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
90.	People divide into groups because of the differences between the groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
91.	All groups of people are created equally.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
92.	A person's ethnic group determines much of who they are.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
93.	There is no difference between Soviets and Americans.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
94.	People from different ethnic groups are not as important to me as people from my own group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
95.	I only feel safe with people from my own group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
96.	The problems in the world which frighten me are caused by people of different ethnic backgrounds.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
97.	People from some ethnic groups are more valuable than people of other ethnic groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Finally, some background information is needed to know the range of different people that filled out the questionnaires. Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. It is best if you answer every question. However, if there are some that you can't or do not wish to answer, leave them blank and write a short explanatory note. Thank you for your time and effort.

1. Sex: _____ male   _____ female

2. Age: _____

3. Your own ethnic background and cultural identification:

    Asian   _____
    Black   _____
    Latino/Latina   _____
    Native American   _____
    Pacific Islander   _____
    White   _____
    Other (please write in) _____

4. What was the highest grade in school you completed:

    _____   None
    _____   Some elementary
    _____   Elementary school graduate
    _____   Junior high school
    _____   Some high school
    _____   High school graduate
    _____   Special training (trade school)
    _____   Some college
    _____   2 year college degree
    _____   4 year college degree
    _____   Some graduate school
    _____   Graduate degree: specify: _____

5. Marital Status:

    _____   Married
    _____   Single
    _____   Living together but not married
    _____   Separated
    _____   Divorced
    _____   Widowed

6. Do you have children:

    _____   No
    _____   Yes (If yes, how many) _____

7.   How many people usually lived in your household during the   last   year:_____. I   can't   answer because:_____

_____

8.   Your occupation:_____

9.   Your work situation (check as many as apply):

_____   Taking care of household and/or children is my full-time job.
_____   Employed part-time
_____   Employed full-time
_____   Unemployed
_____   Full-time student
_____   Retired
_____   Other (specify: _____)

10. What is your total yearly income (not including other family   members):

_____   No income
_____   Less than $5,000
_____ $5,001 to $10,000
_____ $10,001 to $15,000
_____ $15,001 to $20,000
_____ $20,001 to $25,000
_____ $25,001 to $30,000
_____ $30,001 to $40,000
_____ $40,001 to $50,000
_____ $50,001 to $75,000
_____ $75,001 to $100,000
_____   Over $100,001

11. What is the other income of the family members living with   you (e.g., your spouse):

_____   Not applicable (live alone)
_____   No income
_____   Less than $5000
_____ $5,001 to $10,000
_____ $10,001 to $15,000
_____ $15,001 to $20,000
_____ $20,001 to $25,000
_____ $25,001 to $30,000
_____ $30,001 to $40,000
_____ $40,001 to $50,000
_____ $50,001 to $75,000
_____ $75,001 to $100,000
_____   Over $100,001

12. Religion:

      _____   None
      _____   Protestant (specify): _____
      _____   Catholic
      _____   Jewish
      _____   Buddhist
      _____   Moslem
      _____   Other (specify): _____

13. How involved are you in your religious affiliation?

      _____   Strongly involved
      _____   Moderately involved
      _____   Slightly involved
      _____   Not involved
      _____   Not applicable (no religion)

14. With which political party do you identify?

      _____   Democrat
      _____   Republican
      _____   Independent
      _____   Other (specify): _____
      _____   None
      _____   Don't know

15. How do you primarily vote?

      _____   Democratic
      _____   Republican
      _____   Neither
      _____   Other (specify): _____

16. All in all, I'd rate myself politically as:

      _____   Very liberal
      _____   Liberal
      _____   Slightly liberal
      _____   Neither liberal or conservative
      _____   Slightly conservative
      _____   Conservative
      _____   Very conservative
      _____   Don't know

17. Politically, I would say I'm:

      _____   Strongly involved
      _____   Moderately involved
      _____   Slightly involved
      _____   Not involved

18. Have you been a member of military service?

    _____   No
    _____   Yes (if yes, specify:)_____

19. Have you ever fought in a war?

    _____   No
    _____   Yes (if yes, specify:) _____

20. Have you been a resident of a country while a war was being fought on its own soil.

    _____   No
    _____   Yes (if yes, which country and or/which war)
    _____

21. Your birthplace: _____

22. Your current citizenship: _____

APPENDIX C

Race Different

1. Other cultures seem mysterious and different to me.

12. People are all basically the same regardless of their ethnic origin. (R)

40. There are many differences, besides color, between me and people from other ethnic groups.

60. I have little in common with people of different ethnic groups.

77. There are no differences between people of different ethnic origins. (R)

80. People are different because of the cultures they grew up in.

87. People are the same all over the world, regardless of their race. (R)

92. A person's ethnic group determines much of who they are.

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Race Less Valuable

15. People from ethnic groups different than my own are not as kind.

26. I value people of my same ethnic group more than others.

54. I find interaction with people of different ethnic backgrounds beneficial. (R)

69. People from other ethnic groups rarely achieve as much as people from my own ethnic group.

72. People from my own ethnic group are better than people from other ethnic groups.

88. People from different ethnic groups are equal. (R)

94. People from different ethnic groups are not as important to me as people from my own group.

97. People from some ethnic groups are more valuable than people of other ethnic groups.

Race Dangerous

9. Other ethnic groups take things away from my ethnic group.

16. People from different ethnic backgrounds are no more dangerous than anyone else. (R)

21. When I am in a group of people who are from a different ethnic group than my own, I feel afraid.

25. I feel safe with people from all types of ethnic backgrounds. (R)

44. People of ethnic groups other than mine tend to be more threatening.

62. I feel people of different ethnic groups pose a threat to my security.

86. People from different ethnic backgrounds intend me harm.

96. The problems in the world which frighten me are caused by people of different ethnic backgrounds.

Soviet Different

2. Despite problems the Soviets are much like us. (R)

18. Soviet people are similar to Americans. (R)

29. The Soviets think differently than we do.

33. Soviet's concerns are much like ours. (R)

51. The Soviet people are fundamentally different from us.

78. The Soviets are different than us in every way.

82. The Soviets experience things differently than we do.

93. There is no difference between Soviets and Americans. (R)

Soviet-Less Valuable

10. The Soviets are basically inferior to Americans.

30. We could benefit from a better relationship with the Soviets. (R)

38. Americans are better at most things than the Soviets.

53. We could learn some things from the Soviets. (R)

65. The Soviets are likeable. (R)

70. The Soviets often act in ways that are wrong.

73. Soviets and Americans are basically equal. (R)

89. The Americans are superior to Soviets.

Soviet-Dangerous

13. The Soviets cannot be trusted.

20. We will not be secure as long as the USSR exists.

31. The Soviets are evil.

34. The Soviets intend to wipe out democracy.

37. We must always be cautious with the Soviets.

43. We cannot let our guard down with the Soviets.

46. The Soviets pose no direct threat to us. (R)

55. The more the Soviets know about us the more vulnerable we are.

59. We have no reason to fear the Soviets. (R)

In-group/Out-group Different

8. People from my own group are no different than people of other groups. (R)

23. There are major differences between groups of people.

28. I find the differences between myself and people from other groups to be less important than the similarities. (R)

39. The world is made up of many groups of people who are very different from each other.

61. All people are the same. (R)

74. There will always be groups of people who are different than my group.

83. Groups of people develop different ways of experiencing the world.

90. People divide into groups because of the differences between the groups.

In-group/Out-group Less Valuable

4. I tend to like people more if they are like me.

17. Interacting with people from many backgrounds enriches my day to day life. (R)

35. I prefer being with people of the same background as my own.

41. I don't like people from groups different than mine.

52. Other groups are not as valuable as my own.

56. I enjoy learning about groups other than my own. (R)

81. My group is better than any other group.

91. All groups of people are created equally. (R)

In-Group/Out-Group Dangerous

3. I am afraid of people from groups other than mine.

11. I do not feel vulnerable around people from groups other than mine. (R)

22. I feel safe with people from many different backgrounds. (R)

42. People from groups other than mine pose a threat to me.

45. People from groups other than mine are no more dangerous than anyone else. (R)

79. People from other groups would harm me if they had the chance.

84. There is no reason to fear someone just because they come from a different group. (R)

95. I only feel safe with people from my own group.

Indirect Violence

5. There are good reasons that people are paid differently for the same job.

32. There will always be people in poverty.

49. The best system requires there be lower, middle, and upper classes.

50. All people should have equal access to good medical care. (R)

57. We should not let all small groups in society have equal say in the way things are run.

66. Sometimes people take equality too far.

71. All people should be treated equally in the work place. (R)

75. It bothers me that some people die of hunger. (R)

Direct Violence

6. Physical violence seems to be unavoidable.

14. There are times when the only way to solve conflict is to plan to injure the opposition.

19. There are circumstances in which a person has a right to plan to hurt someone.

48. We should allow criminals to kill each other off.

58. Talking is always a better alternative than violent action. (R)

64. There is nothing wrong with attacking someone who threatens violence.

68. Fighting is never the best way to resolve a problem. (R)

85. There will always be situations in which we have to plan to hurt someone.

War

7.   The best way to resolve certain conflicts is with military action.

24. The use of nuclear weapons is justified in some situations.

27. War is unacceptable. (R)

36. There are situations in which we have no choice but to go to war.

47. We will always have wars.

63. We should fight a war if our values are threatened.

67. If attacked militarily we should respond with military action.

76. It is honorable to fight in a war.

APPENDIX D

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix For Racism

Race Different Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7
Q 1	.18193	.13732	.04748	.46509*	-.09378	.12403	-.11101
Q12	.22511	.00990	.55165*	.05812	-.02455	.05140	.14695
Q40	-.13716	.20161	.21716	.57477*	.16203	.08394	.39587
Q60	.68387*	.02336	.06847	.02752	.02239	.01430	-.01735
Q77	-.02685	-.23291	.35980	.49577*	.08632	-.04229	.02764
Q80	-.15791	.09320	-.05347	.28632	.14604	-.03134	-.04289
Q87	.08313	.15571	.80004*	.16948	.11008	.01346	.03952
Q92	.05326	.32368	.01871	.43300	-.01149	.00731	.36236

Race Less Valuable Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7
Q15	.54132*	.28398	.19213	-.00698	.10312	.11182	.10870
Q26	18328	.67435*	.05080	.09261	.11223	-.04701	.17000
Q54	.18774	.17497	.35286	-.09782	.12054	-.12281	-.22447
Q69	.50767*	.18461	-.02128	-.09371	.17402	.18460	.29007
Q72	.65821*	.23631	.15841	-.06511	.19153	.07659	.05553
Q48	.28697	.15634	.54406*	.04106	.20535	.07265	.27294
Q94	.18075	.36745	.18355	.09900	.49337*	-.00345	.03378
Q97	.29993	.22359	.20266	.03414	.68066*	.13326	.01486

Note. * denotes a significant correlation

(table continues)

Race Dangerous Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7
Q 9	.08306	.48958*	-.00788	.07195	.13750	.18601	-.11976
Q16	.11926	.02349	.16222	-.01105	.02270	.07790	.47305*
Q23	.15452	.15421	.00794	.06933	.06767	.83234*	.09708
Q25	.15711	.37083	.16298	.02455	.09296	.30899	.21558
Q44	.30818	.41579	.17748	.08295	.15755	.17602	.16776
Q62	.25528	.44294	.14599	.19562	.14994	.12580	.01488
Q86	.49621*	.27836	.06692	.04131	.14711	.33913	.09826
Q96	.39692	.09560	-.08094	.15457	.37263	.11198	.15556

Note. * denotes a significant correlation

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APPENDIX E

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix For Nationalism

Soviet Different Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
Q2	.17755	.60143*	.17052	.16328	.18487	.08901
Q18	.01172	.70427*	.20813	.15807	.15552	.19234
Q29	.16649	.39784	-.11501	.09365	.44327	.13410
Q33	.21992	.47383*	.15501	.40626	.15984	.06419
Q51	.12762	.18491	.21168	.14142	.55563*	.06744
Q78	.17824	.10266	.34995	.20376	.47066*	-.05500
Q82	.00037	.05927	.08942	-.18903	.53501*	.04809
Q93	.10411	.25434	.03224	-.01706	.08229	.56658*
Soviet Less Valuable Items						
Q10	.09101	.14057	.53395*	.16918	.20660	-.11195
Q30	-.01712	.18017	.17025	.76714*	.06291	-.03340
Q38	.16715	.12923	.66329*	.08300	.10747	.01208
Q53	.15523	.16267	.15102	.66199*	-.05118	.04639
Q65	.37893	.50054*	.28917	.22237	-.01021	.00475
Q70	.45966*	.01476	.23167	.12089	.17294	.19978
Q73	.17769	.36946	.38004	.20367	.22121	.44165
Q89	.18977	.20020	.64361*	.24090	.11153	.26319

Note. denotes a significant correlation.

(table continues)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
Soviet Dangerous Items						
Q13	.65828*	.32085	.03470	.10689	.07562	.04056
Q20	.47642*	.08936	.19736	.20884	.32856	.02657
Q31	.34052	.12151	.34548	.42942	.12311	.10978
Q34	.52023*	.03878	.27307	.14559	.27224	-.07498
Q37	.59643*	.37928	.05959	-.16321	-.09257	.14365
Q43	.68418*	.34798	.18004	.06553	.04000	.12896
Q46	.64185*	-.02036	.10103	.06883	.05906	.42672
Q55	.47265*	-.09424	.21418	.25385	.36462	.11325
Q59	.53032*	-.01068	-.11654	.00862	-.03756	.58876*

Note. denotes a significant correlation.

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Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix for In-group/Out-group

In-group/Out-group Different Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7
Q 8	.01904	-.00716	.25178	.05871	-.18859	.52904*	.18627
Q23	.11522	.02806	.20145	.72266*	-.00178	.00832	-.02144
Q28	.03835	.25856	-.02170	.32984	.21123	.02174	.08032
Q39	.14078	-.11181	.00281	.52908*	-.13847	.06908	.12650
Q61	.07996	.05699	.23181	.18928	-.01177	.59387*	-.04469
Q74	.11336	-.20472	-.15884	.52635*	.34536	.13900	-.04107
Q81	-.01138	-.42803	-.07385	.16866	.07930	.10047	-.10046
Q90	.40945	.08300	-.07000	.10257	-.02747	.17216	-.08814
In-group/Out-group Less Valuable Items							
Q 4	.32445	-.10592	-.06071	.05232	.42645	.06993	.08781
Q17	.15773	.64392*	.01306	.02010	.08232	.27282	.00669
Q35	.57401*	.00363	.05273	.01623	.44851	.15852	.01709
Q41	.58585*	.10587	.27592	.08308	.17729	.00365	.06203

Note. * denotes a significant correlation.

(table continues)

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In-group/Out-group Less Valuable Item	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7
Q52	.55266*	.33608	.21447	.14490	.11558	-.06863	.10806
Q56	.32862	.58286*	.25700	.06467	.01640	.17784	-.00792
Q81	.46171*	.27412	.49581*	-.02964	.04328	-.15871	.12069
Q91	.01909	.09190	.57641*	.10996	.02738	.15429	.03269

In-group/Out-group Dangerous Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7
Q 3	.26930	.04174	.33643	-.04992	.22131	.21257	-.07991
Q11	.03577	.10127	-.11344	-.03046	.17593	.42680	-.01623
Q22	.15443	.10617	.22493	.00433	.67504*	-.07332	.00668
Q42	.53668*	.00702	.10705	.05917	.13986	.01598	.12218
Q45	.17719	.15758	.05713	.12211	.07135	.05573	.90407*
Q79	.32292	.29467	.28607	.12886	.07350	-.16949	-.04092
Q84	.20967	.39093	.38966	-.16523	-.02167	.17713	.10741
Q95	.55750*	.19924	.04571	.10264	.04305	.03025	.07210

Note. denotes a significant correlation.

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